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FOOD FOR THOUGHT: GENETICALLY
MODIFIED SEEDS AS DE FACTO
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS
BENJAMIN M. COLE, BRENT J. HORTON, & RYAN VACCA*

For several years, courts have improperly calculated damages in
cases involving the unlicensed use of genetically modified (GM)
seed technology. In particular, when courts determine patent
damages based on the hypothetical negotiation method, they err
in exaggerating these damages to a point where no rational
negotiator would agree. In response, we propose a limited
affirmative defense of an implied license due to the patent's
status as a de facto standard-essential patent. To be classified
as a de facto standard-essential patent, the farmer must prove
three elements that reflect the peculiarities of GM seeds used in
farming: (1) dominance, (2) impracticability, and (3) necessary
to fulfill a basic human need, such as for use as food. Based on
the approaches used by courts and standard setting
organizations in licensing standard-essential patents in
technological fields such as cell phones and software,
designation of some GM seeds as standard-essential patents
allows the courts to imply a license from patentees to farmers on
reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. Doing so
shifts the case from a tort-based patent infringement suit to a
breach of contract dispute and alters the damages regime from
one based in compensation, deterrence, and punishment (a tort
approach) to one based solely in compensation (a contractual
approach). As a result of this novel proposal, the damages
calculations in these suits return to economic reality.

* Benjamin M. Cole is an Assistant Professor of Management Systems at the
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INTRODUCTION

Kem L. Ralph owned a farm in western Tennessee growing
cotton, soybeans, and corn. 1 In preparation for the 1998
planting season, he "purchased 264 fifty-pound bags of soybean
seed containing [Monsanto's) Roundup Ready biotechnology."2

I.

2.

Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id.
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"Roundup Ready" is shorthand for seed that is genetically
modified (GM) to be resistant to Roundup herbicide.3 When
Roundup is sprayed on crops, weeds are killed, but the GM
plant survives.4
Monsanto 5 patented the genetic modifications necessary to
the production of "Roundup Ready" seed.6 More precisely, it
patented "recombinant gene sequences that can be inserted
into plant seeds to protect them against the effects of
glyphosate-based herbicides."7 When farmers purchase and
plant the "Roundup Ready" seed, they are making use of the
patent. 8 As such, each time the farmers purchase bags they pay
a "Technology Fee" for licenses that cost approximately $5 per
bag.9 But the licenses are narrow; they allow the farmers to use
those particular bags of seed for one season only. IO
However, the limited nature of the license contravenes an
important facet of nature: that seed begets seed. A soybean
plant with twenty-two pods can produce fifty-five seeds. 11 This
has implications for farming tradition and practice. 12 Farmers
harvest most of their crop to feed the public, but from a portion
of their crop, farmers harvest seed for use during the next
growing season. 13 Ralph was no different. 14 Ralph recovered

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Throughout this Article, references to Monsanto represent the firm as a
patent holder of GM seed strains. Other firms holding similar patent rights for
GM seed strains or traits include BASF, Bayer CropScience, Dow Chemical,
DuPont, Pioneer Hi-Bred, and Syngenta, among others. William Neuman, Rapid
Rise in Seed Prices Draws U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010,
http://www.nytirnes.com/2010/03/12/business/12seed.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O.
6. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1377.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Each pod contains on average 2.5 seeds. CHAD LEE & JIM HERBEK,
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, ESTIMATING SOYBEAN
YIELD 2 (2005), available at http://www.ca.uky.edu/agc/pubs/agr/agrl88/
agrl88.pdf.
12. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto's Gene Police Raise Alarm On
Farmers' Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, http://www.artsci.
wustl.edu/-anthro/articles/rnonsantol.htrnl (describing farmers who follow the
tradition of harvesting and replanting seeds as "seed savers").
13. See Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting
Around Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93,
95-96 (2006) (discussing the "time-honored practice" of saving seed).
14. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1377.
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796 bags of seed from the 1998 growing harvest for use in the
1999 growing season and recovered 438 bags of seed from the
1999 growing harvest for use in the 2000 growing season.15
Monsanto sued Ralph, asserting that Ralph's license was
for one season only-1998-and claiming that planting in 1999
and 2000 infringed its patent. 16 The issue in the case was not
whether Ralph had violated Monsanto's patent.17 It was clear
that he had, when he admitted in court to destroying evidence
in violation of a court order to not move his seeds or his crops,
which were being investigated by Monsanto for the violation. 18
The issue was how to measure damages. 19 Ralph insisted that
he should pay the established royalty for use of the seed.20 He
argued that the "standard Technology Fee that Monsanto
charges all farmers is 'the most established royalty [that]
patent infringement litigation has ever seen."'21 And that as a
result, the court should take the total number of bags of seed
he recovered over the two years and multiply that by the per
bag Technology Fee, i.e., (796 + 438) multiplied by $5/bag =
$6,170. 22 The court rejected Ralph's argument, finding that his
use of the patent was broader than what the Technology Fee
would cover. 23 Again, the license was very narrow, limiting use
of the GM seed to producing one year's crop; Ralph was using
the GM seed to produce one year's crop and seed for the next
year.2 4
The court also seemed concerned that simply awarding the
Technology Fee would not result in adequate deterrence; if it
awarded only $6, 170 in damages, future farmers would have no
incentive to follow the law.25 Future farmers could infringe the
patent and would pay the royalty fee only if the patent holder

15. Id.

at 1377-78.
Id. at 1378.
17. Id.
18. In fact, the district court struck Ralph's answer, affirmative defenses, and
counterclaims when he admitted to destroying evidence, specifically, using tires
and diesel fuel to burn 900 bags of seed in a bonfire that lasted two days. Id.; see
also Peter Shinkle, Fighting From The Ground Up; Monsanto Reaps Some Anger
With Hard Line On Reusing Seed, GRAND FORKS HERALD, May 20, 2003, at Dl.
19. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1383.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1379.
23. Id at 1382.
24. Id. at 1377-78.
25. See id. at 1380-81.
16.
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caught them.26 Such reasoning ignores the court's ability to
treble the reasonable royalty to $18,510.27 Nor does such
reasoning consider the time and money required to defend such
a suit.
Which party holds the moral high ground in the battle
between Monsanto and farmer is a matter of perspective.
Monsanto claims that ''between 1997 and April 2010 [it] filed
just 144 lawsuits to enforce [its] patent rights against
farmers,"28 and only as a last resort, when necessary to "secure
investment and innovation."29 Monsanto's detractors point out
that those lawsuits that have been filed-together with the 700
investigations conducted by Monsanto-intimidate farmers,
preventing them from carrying on the centuries-old tradition of
saving seeds, even when those seeds were not patented. 30 The
intimidation stems from the sheer cost of defending against
such lawsuits, not to mention the possibility of large judgments
against the farmer. Kem Ralph, for example, whose story is
told above, was forced to declare bankruptcy in 2007 following
his own battle with Monsanto. 31 The Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filing was a last ditch attempt to save Ralph's farm.32 As to the
filing, Ralph stated, "I'm a farmer, ... they may take [my farm]
away from me, but they're going to have to fight me first. All I

26. See Brian Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent
Infringement Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REV. 909, 924 (2009) (quoting Maxwell v. J.
Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 284 ("the court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed."). In Monsanto Co. v. Roeder, the court suggested
this logical approach, but Monsanto argued that such a limitation would not be
proper and the court relented. Monsanto Co. v. Roeder, No. 07-01422S, 2009 WL
4907014, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Dec. 14, 2009).
28. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d
544, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
29. Repps Hudson, Illinois Farmers Want To Be Able To Keep Some Patented
Seeds, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2005, at Bl.
30. See Brief of Amici Curiae Farm & Ranch Freedom Alliance et al. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants in Support of Reversal at 12, Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., No. 2012-1298 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2012)
(arguing that the district court erred in dismissing the suit); Michelle Ma,
Comment, Anticipating and Reducing the Unfairness of Monsanto's Inadvertent
Infringement Lawsuits: A Proposal to Import Copyright Law's Notice-and
Takedown Regime into the Seed Patent Context, 100 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (2012)
(describing Monsanto's "propensity to heavily guard its intellectual property").
31. Andy Meek, Down and Out in Covington, DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2006,
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2006/jun/22/down-and-out-in-covington.
32. Id.
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want is justice to be served." 33 The mere existence of such
bankruptcy filings likely intimidates farmers.
When one considers that farmers are being forced into
bankruptcy simply because they carry on a centuries-old
tradition of saving seeds, it makes sense that some
commentators characterize Monsanto's litigation strategy as
overzealous. As one commentator points out:
Monsanto has been very aggressive in enforcing these
restrictions, especially the restriction on farmers saving
seed. As of October 26, 2007, Monsanto had filed 112
lawsuits against farmers for alleged violations of its
Technology Agreement and/or its patents on genetically
engineered seed. In addition to the over 100 lawsuits that
have actually been filed, there are many more suits that
have ended in private out-of-court settlements. The inability
of farmers to save Roundup Ready seed has turned the
agricultural world on its head. 34

The potential consequences of being accused of patent
infringement further comes into focus when one considers the
damages awarded. In Ralph, the damages for infringing the
soybean patent were $66,639 and subsequently trebled to
$199,918.35 The total damages entered against Ralph reached
$2,937,527.07.36 Farmers like Ralph are unique in their
societal role as providers bee a use they are fulfilling basic needs
for little monetary reward.3 7 As such, when they follow the
time-honored tradition of saving seed, they should not face
damages totaling thirty times their yearly net profits.38
Compensation to Monsanto, not punishing the farmer, should
be the goal.39
33. Id.
34. Tempe Smith, Note, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case Study to
Examine the Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically
Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629, 630 (2010).
35. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
36. Id.
37. The median household income for farms specializing in cash grains such
as corn or soybeans in 2011 was only $76,301. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Econ. Res.
Serv., Farm Household Income: Median Farm Household Income up in 2011 and
Forecast Higher in 2012 (2013), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data
products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartld=31715.
38. See calculations infra Part II.B.
39. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
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The urgency of this issue-and the need for a paradigm
shift-is illustrated by the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Bowman v. Monsanto Co., which upheld a judgment
in the amount of $84,456 against a seventy-five-year-old farmer
from Indiana. 40 Monsanto brought suit against Bowman after
he purchased commodity seeds from a grain elevator, which he
correctly assumed would contain seeds carrying the Roundup
Ready trait. 41 Bowman sprayed the resulting crop with
Roundup and harvested seeds from the plants that survived for
use during the next growing season. 42 He continued this over
many seasons, effectively eliminating the need to purchase
Roundup Ready seeds from Monsanto in the future, by making
his own.43 Monsanto claimed that Bowman's actions
constituted an infringing use of its invention.44 The Supreme
Court agreed with Monsanto, rejecting Bowman's argument
that his purchase from a grain elevator had extinguished
Monsanto's patent, stating:
[Were we to hold otherwise] other seed companies could
reproduce the product and market it to growers, thus
depriving Monsanto of its monopoly. And farmers
themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from
Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The
grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then
multiply that new creation, ad infinitum-each time
profiting from the patented seed without compensating its
inventor. Bowman's late-season plantings offer a prime
illustration. After buying beans for a single harvest,
Bowman saved enough seed each year to reduce or
eliminate the need for additional purchases. 4 5

Important for our purposes, while the Court did limit the
holding to the "situation before [it],"46 a literal reading of the
decision would seem to apply to even a farmer who unwittingly

40.

133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013); David G. Savage, Farmer Loses Seed Patent

Case, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at BL
41. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1767.
46. Id. at 1769.
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used seeds that contained Monsanto technology. 47
To remedy the problem of inflated damage awards against
farmers using GM seed, we propose that patents governing GM
seeds should be deemed de facto standard-essential patents (de
facto SEP), 4 8 when certain requirements are met. Specifically,
these requirements are that: (1) the patent holder has achieved
dominance in a given field, (2) it is impracticable to expect that
a farmer could operate without infringing the patent, and (3)
the farmer is growing a crop used to meet a basic human
need. 49
Once the GM seed has been labeled a de facto SEP, courts
can find an implied license between Monsanto and farmers.50
Authority for implying a license can be found by analogizing
from the hardware and software industries, where standard
essential patents are common and standard setting
organizations (SSOs) are frequently used to mandate licenses
on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. 51 As a
result of an implied license, courts can transform patent
infringement, from a tort to a contract dispute.5 2 This new
perspective would change the damages regime from one based
in compensation, deterrence, and punishment to one based in

47. Timothy B. Lee, Could the Monsanto Case Sow Future Patent Fights?,
WASH. POST, May 19, 2013, at G02. As Washington Post Reporter Timothy B. Lee
perceptively observed:
It's a common-sense ruling, but it raises an interesting problem: How
can a farmer who isn't interested in using Monsanto's soybeans avoid
infringing? Bowman was trying to get Monsanto beans on the cheap, but
other farmers might want generic soybeans. Monsanto's beans are so
ubiquitous that even organic farmers who deliberately avoid planting
Monsanto's beans can wind up growing beans with Monsanto's DNA due
to cross-pollination. So is a farmer who accidentally buys and plants
beans with Roundup Ready genes guilty of patent infringement? ...
Monsanto says it has no intention of going after farmers who use its
beans by accident, so organic farmers don't need to worry in the short
term. But the ruling creates the theoretical possibility of biotech "patent
trolls" who sue farmers for accidentally planting infringing seeds.
Id.
48. See 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY§ 35.1, at 35-37 (2d
ed. 2009); see also Ramirez, infra note 251, at 4; see infra Part III.A., for an
explanation of SEPs.
49. See infra Part III.B.
50. See infra Part IILC.l.
51. See infra Part III.C.l.
52. See infra Part IILC.2.
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compensation only.53 The balanced approach proposed here has
the advantage of recognizing that Monsanto has a right to
protect its patents and that its patents can be a force for good.
GM seed can increase food production.5 4 Some even see GM
organisms as a solution to world hunger.55 To that end,
"Monsanto has produced a GM rice, 'golden rice,' which
contains high levels of beta carotene to prevent vitamin A
health
problems." 56
Technological
deficiency-related
advancements in seeds have brought tremendous benefits to
consumers around the world, but they have also brought
tremendous risk to farmers through potential lawsuits
stemming from alleged misuse of those technologies. Our
approach of giving the courts the leeway to determine that a
given patented seed technology has become the de facto
standard in a particular market allows farmers to pursue their
occupation without increasing the potential for bankruptcy,
while at the same time allowing patent holders to receive
financial compensation for unauthorized use of their patented
technologies. This Article moves beyond the existing literature,
which tends to take an absolutist approach (e.g., Monsanto
should not have the ability to patent genetic sequences)5 7 or
infringement should have an intent element.58
Part I of this Article explains Monsanto's GM seed patents
53. See infra Part III.C.2.
54. Each plant is more productive and the space between rows (necessary for
weeding) can be reduced. David J. Schnier, Genetically Modified Organisms &
The Cartagena Protocol, 12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 385-86 (2001).
55. Erik Benny, "Natural" Modifications: The FDA's Need to Promulgate an
Official Definition of "Natural" that Includes Genetically Modified Organisms, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1504, 1520 (2012).
56. Zachary Lerner, Rethinking What Agriculture Could Use: A Proposed
Heightened Utility Standard for Genetically Modified Food Patents, 55 U. KAN. L.
REV. 991, 999 (2007).
57. See, e.g., Lara E. Ewens, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property
and the Quest for High Yield Seeds, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 287 (2000)
(arguing for the diminishment "of intellectual property protection for plants by
lowering the number of years patents extend protection"); Kojo Yelpaala, Owning
the Secret of Life: Biotechnology and Property Rights Revisited, 32 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 111, 114 (2000) (questioning whether biotechnology should be patentable).
58. See, e.g., Brennan Delaney, Note, What Happens When the Gene Gets Out
of the Bottle?: The Necessity of an Intent Element for Infringement of Patents
Claiming Genetically Modified Organisms, 76 UMKC L. REV. 553 (2007)
(proposing an intent element for patent infringement); see also Kathleen C. Rose,
Comment, Protecting The Farmers: Limiting Liability For Innocent Infringement
Of Plant Patents, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 117 (2011)
(proposing a defense for innocent infringement).
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and describes the types of farmers using these seeds and the
activities they engage in that constitute patent infringement.59
Part II explains the methods of calculating damages and
describes how courts have routinely enjoined infringing
farmers from further use of GM seed and subjected them to tort
damages, which have been inflated for deterrent or punitive
impact.60 Part III argues that a more appropriate model exists
for reconciling the competing interests of Monsanto and
farmers.61 Where patented technology necessary for the
provision of a human need reaches de facto SEP status, a
license should be implied between the patent holder and those
users who cannot practicably fulfill such human need without
infringing the patent. Such a license should be based on
reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. However,
Part III also argues that this departure from the traditional
operation of patent law should be limited to cases where the
farmer is not competing with the patentee by knowingly selling
GM crops or seed for others to replant, that is to say, actively
competing with Monsanto.6 2 Finally, Part IV analogizes the
proposal in this Article to the Plant Variety Protection Act to
illustrate how the implied license scheme has support under
existing law.63

I.

PATENTS, FARMERS, AND INFRINGEMENT

To appreciate the problem and proposed solution, it is
helpful to have an understanding of what the patented
technology is and how it may be infringed. This section
describes the patents currently involved in the GM seed
litigation and then delineates the three types of farmers who
may infringe these patents. Finally, it illustrates the actions
these farmers may take that expose them to liability.

A. Monsanto's Patents
Monsanto "produces genetically modified and patent
protected seed in large-acre crops, including corn, cotton,
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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soybeans, and canola."64 The seed genes are altered to increase
plant yield and, most importantly, immunize them against
Roundup, Monsanto's herbicide.65 Thus, these GM seeds are
also called Roundup Ready.66 United States' patents largely
protect these herbicide-resistant technologies.6 7 In these two
patents, Monsanto claims the following: (1) glyphosate-tolerant
plants (i.e., herbicide-resistant plants), (2) genetically modified
seeds for glyphosate-tolerant plants, (3) the specific modified
genes, and (4) the method of producing these GM plants.68

B. Infringing Farmers
There are three types of farmers69 that could face potential
legal liability for infringing Monsanto's patents. The
potentially infringing activities are quite broad. Each category
of farmer is discussed in turn below, together with the
potentially infringing activity in which the farmers engage.

Ma, supra note 30, at 694.
Id. at 701.
66. Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
67. See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435 (filed Sept. 13, 1994); U.S. Patent
No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993).
68. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also
U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435 (filed Sept. 13, 1994); U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed
Oct. 28, 1993). Monsanto's Canadian patents are similar. As described m
Monsanto v. Schmeiser, the claims in the Canadian patent include:
(1) a chimeric gene: this is a gene that does not exist in nature and is
constructed from different species; (2) an expression vector: this is a
DNA molecule into which another DNA segment has been integrated so
as to be useful as a research tool; (3) a plant transformation vector: used
to permanently insert a chimeric gene into a plant's own DNA; (4)
various species of plant cells into which the chimeric gene has been
inserted; [and] (5) a method of regenerating a glyphosate-resistant plant.
Once the cell is stimulated to grow into a plant, all of the differentiated
cells in the plant will contain the chimeric gene, which will be passed on
to offspring of the plant.
Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] l S.C.R. 902, 915-16 (Can.).
69. Farmers in the United States provide American consumers with more
than 80 percent of the food consumed each year, and the agricultural industry
represents one in twelve United States' jobs. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA
Accomplishments 2009-2012: Agriculture (2012), available at http://www.usda.
gov/documents/Results-Ag-Production.pdf. Additionally, the agricultural industry
occupies roughly one-fifth of the nation's land (408 million acres) for crop
production and an additional one-fourth of the nation's land (613 million acres) for
livestock grazing. See Land Use Overview, Ag 101, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/aglOlllanduse.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2013).
64.

65.
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Types of Farmers

The three types of farmers who could be liable for patent
infringement are: (a) the drift farmer, (b) the direct-purchasing
farmer, and (c) the indirect-purchasing farmer.

a. Drift Farmers
The first category-and most sympathetic of the
infringers-is the drift farmer. Drift farmers find themselves
using the patented genetic sequence and growing the patented
plant when it drifts into their field through natural pollination
processes (via wind, water, or animal movement70), resulting in
cross-pollination of GM varieties with non-GM varieties, or
through the germination of GM seeds dropped in transit.71
Pollen from plants containing a GM sequence can be carried as
far as thirteen miles by the wind72 and over three miles by
bees.73 Agricultural research has confirmed the presence of
unintended gene flow into jealously guarded organic crop lines,
related wild varieties, and even weeds.74 The cross-pollination
and hybridization between seed varieties can happen extremely
quickly; farmers in Canada discovered plants resistant to three
different herbicide products (each uniquely patented by its
respective IP owner) within two years of introduction of single
70.

Ma, supra note 30, at 703.
71. Stuart Smyth et al., Liabilities and Economics of Transgenic Crops, 20
NATURE BIOTECH. 537, 537 (2002), available at http://www.dnai.org/media/
bioinformatics/ccli/CD/readings/smythetal2002.pdf.
72. Lidia S. Watrud et al., Evidence for Landscape-Level, Pollen-Mediated
Gene Flow from Genetically Modified Creeping Bentgrass with CP4 EPSPS as a
Marker, 101 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 14,533, 14,533 (2004), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/101/40/14533.full.pdf+html.
73. KATIE EASTHAM & JEREMY SWEET, EUR. ENV'T AGENCY, GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS (GMOS): THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENE FLOW THROUGH
POLLEN TRANSFER 16 (2002).
74. Norman C. Ellstrand et al., Gene Flow and Introgression from
Domesticated Plants into their Wild Relatives, 30 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 539, 544 (1999); A. Piiieyro-Nelson et al., Transgenes in Mexican

Maize: Molecular Evidence and Methodological Considerations for GMO Detection
in Landrace Populations, 18 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 750, 759 (2009); David Quist
& Ignacio Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed into Traditional Maize
Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541, 542 (2001); M.L. Zapiola et al.,
Escape and Establishment of Transgenic Glyphosate-Resistant Creeping Bentgrass
Agrostis Stolonifera in Oregon, USA: A 4-Year Study, 45 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 486,
488 (2008). See generally, NORMAN C. ELLSTRAND, DANGEROUS LIAISONS? WHEN
CULTIVATED PLANTS MATE WITH THEIR WILD RELATIVES (2003).
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herbicide resistant seeds to the area. 75 Even patent holders of
such seed technology recognize the possibility of unintentional
gene flow into other crops. In its 2001 Prospectus leading up to
its initial public offering, for example, Monsanto listed the
"possible presence of unintended biotechnology material" in
conventional seeds among the market risks it considered
material to investors, and the firm has continued to list the
"adventitious presence" of biotechnology traits as a risk factor
in recent federal filings.76 Still, given the court cases to date,
farmers, not patent holders, bear the true risk of such gene
flow.77

b. Direct-Purchasing Farmers
The second category is the direct-purchasing farmer.
Direct-purchasing farmers are those who purchase seed from
an authorized seed company.78 An authorized seed company is
one that is licensed by Monsanto to incorporate the technology

75. Smyth et al., supra note 71, at 538.
76. Monsanto Company, Prospectus (Filing Date: 2000-10-19) 12 (2001);
Monsanto Company, 10-K (Filing Date 2012-10-19) 9 (2012); Monsanto Company,
10-K (Filing Date: 2011-11-14) 11 (2011), available at http://www.monsanto.
com/investors/Pages/archived-annual-reports.aspx.
77. For a case about inadvertent infringement that garnered worldwide
attention, see Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
After Schmeiser's neighbors began using GM seed, he claimed he was the victim
of "drift." That is, despite Schmeiser not buying or planting GM seed, by 1998, the
vast majority of his canola crop was made up of GM plants that resulted from seed
that drifted from other farmers' crops. Id. at 912. Specifically, Schmeiser claimed
that the GM plants "derived from [GM seed] that blew onto or near Schmeiser's
land, and was then collected from plants that survived after Schmeiser sprayed
Roundup herbicide around the power poles and in the ditches along the roadway
bordering four of his fields." Id. Thus, Schmeiser found himself in the tenuous
position of using-albeit inadvertently-a technology patented by Monsanto
without having paid the license fee. Id. In 1998, "Monsanto got an anonymous tip
that Schmeiser had an unauthorized field brim-full of the company's Roundup
Ready canola." Colby Cosh, Percy Schmeiser, Stubborn Foe of Genetically Modified
Crops: His Struggle Against a Patent Suit Launched by Monsanto Has Made Him
an Unlikely Hero, VANCOUVER SUN, May 22, 2004, at A.8. An investigator from
Monsanto went to Schmeiser's farm and confirmed that over 95 percent of
Schmeiser's canola crop was Roundup Ready. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. at 912.
Monsanto sued Schmeiser for patent infringement, claiming he had intentionally
harvested and reused Roundup Ready seed without a license. Id. Monsanto won
the case, but the court refused to award damages. Id. at 937-39.
78. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph,
382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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into its germplasm (i.e., genetic material) and produce
Roundup Ready seeds.7 9 A condition of the license between
Monsanto and the authorized seed company is that the latter is
not permitted to sell GM seed to farmers unless the farmers
also sign a license agreement. so That license agreement
restricts what the farmers may do with the crops.SI
The license agreement signed by the direct-purchasing
farmers imposes certain restrictions on the farmers, including:
(1) prohibiting the use of the GM seed for planting a
commercial crop for more than a single season; (2) prohibiting
farmers from supplying the GM seed to others for planting; (3)
prohibiting farmers from saving the GM seed for replanting or
supplying it to others for replanting; and (4) prohibiting
farmers from using the GM seed or supplying it to others for
crop breeding, research, generation of herbicide registration
data, or seed production.82

c. Indirect-Purchasing Farmers
The third category is the indirect-purchasing farmer, who
purchases the GM seed, but not from an authorized seed
company and does not sign a license agreement with
Monsanto.83 Instead, the indirect-purchasing farmer obtains
the GM seed (and perhaps non-GM seed) from grain elevators
as a commodity purchase.84 A direct-purchasing farmer or a
drift farmer may have supplied the grain elevator with the GM
seed acquired by the indirect-purchasing farmer.85
2.

Potentially Infringing Activities

There are a number of ways in which these farmers can
infringe such patents. The Patent Act declares that "whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any

Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333.
Id.
Id.
82. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff'd,
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
83. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 657 F.3d at 1344-45.
84. Seeds purchased as a commodity from a grain elevator are meant to be
used as food. See id. at 1348.
85. See, e.g., id. at 1345-46.
79.

80.
81.
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patented invention ... infringes the patent."86 As applied to the
above-described farmers, there are three actions they may take
with respect to the patented seeds and plants that could expose
them to liability. These actions include: (1) growing the crops
with this patented gene; (2) growing the crop, saving some of
the seed, and replanting it during the next growing season; and
(3) growing the crop, saving some of the seed, and selling it to
others to plant or otherwise use. Each action is discussed in
turn below.

a. Growing Crops
Farmers who grow GM crops without a license may be
committing patent infringement because growing the GM crops
may constitute making or using the patented invention. This is
of concern for drift farmers and indirect-purchasing farmers.87
These farmers are using the patented seeds by planting them
and are making the patented invention when they grow a GM
seed because the GM seeds are self-replicating.88 Importantly,
patent infringement is a strict liability offense; no intent is
required to infringe.89 Thus, the fact that the drift farmers or
indirect-purchasing farmers did not know they were usmg or
making patented GM seed is of no consequence. 90
86.
87.

35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
It is not a concern for direct-purchasing farmers because they have a
license from Monsanto to plant the seeds and grow the crops for a single season.
See supra Part LB.Lb.
88. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1767 n.3 (2013) (it is not how
the seed is acquired that matters, but the fact that the farmer uses the seed to
make a replica).
89. Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1590 (2011).
90. Lack of notice is relevant in the determination of damages when the
product has not been properly marked under § 287(a). Infringing farmers are
unlikely able to take advantage of this mitigating defense because Monsanto
presumably marks the package or provides a label with the proper notice
attached. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2012). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit avoided answering this question in Monsanto Co. because Monsanto had
given actual notice to Bowman. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2011). Even though drift farmers or indirect-purchasing farmers may
have never had the opportunity to see the notice, this defense will probably be
unavailable to them as long as Monsanto or its seed distributors properly labeled
the bags. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 64 (2001) ("[E]ven when the plaintiff properly marks all
of the articles she makes and sells, there is no requirement that the defendant
actually encounter any of those articles.").
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One type of drift farmer who could infringe by growing
crops is the organic farmer, who is the most sympathetic
infringer. To some, Monsanto should be cast as the villain,
because Monsanto's seeds drift into, and pollute, the organic
farmer's crop; it seems unfair that liability may be lurking
around the corner for the organic farmer, who took no action to
infringe a patent.9 1 This is particularly appalling in the case of
organic farmers because having such seeds contaminate their
crop directly harms their livelihood.92 Organic growers found to
be using chemicals or genetically modified seeds would be
stripped of their ability to label their crops as certified organic,
thus losing a point of differentiation in the market and a
substantial price premium.93 Moreover, the discovery of such
contamination would disqualify the land as fit for organic
production for several years,9 4 depending on the certification
body's requirements.9 5 Indeed, in almost any other context,
where one "pollutes" the crops of another, it would be the

91. Scott Kilman & Jill Carroll, Monsanto Admits Unapproved Seed May Be
in Crops, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at A3.
92. 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) (2012).
93. Jerry Dryer, Getting Serious About Organics, 107 DAIRY FOODS 38 (2006).
Roughly half of Americans surveyed who buy organic milk are willing to pay a 40
percent premium for organic soymilk over non-organic soymilk, and a 30 percent
premium for organic milk, which is produced from cows fed organic feed, over non
organic milk.
94. 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) (2012) (stating "[a]ny field or farm parcel from which
harvested crops are intended to be sold, labeled, or represented as 'organic,'
must: ... (b) [h]ave had no prohibited substances, as listed in § 205.105, applied
to it for a period of 3 years immediately preceding harvest of the crop").
95. See, e.g., Karen Klonsky & Kurt Richter, Statistical Review of California's
Organic Agriculture 2000-2005, AGRIC. ISSUES CENTER, UNIV. OF CALIF., May
2007, at 2 ("The California Organic Products Act (COPA), signed into law in 2003,
provides protection to producers, processors, handlers and consumers in that
foods produced and marketed as organic must meet specific standards. As part of
the regulatory process, COPA requires annual registration of all processors,
growers and handlers of commodities labeled as organic. State registration is
separate from, and does not act as a substitute for, organic certification. State law
mandates registration administered by the California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA) while federal law mandates certification by a USDA
accredited third-party organization."); National Organic Standards Board,
Principles of Organic Production and Handling, NAT'L ORGANIC STANDARDS
BOARD, adopted October 17, 2001, at 1.11 (stating "[g]enetic engineering
(recombinant DNA technology) is a synthetic process designed to control nature at
the molecular level, with the potential for unseen consequences. As such, it is not
compatible with the principles of organic agriculture (either production or
handling). Genetically engineered/modified organisms (GEO/GMOs) and products
produced by or through the use of genetic engineering are prohibited.").
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polluter that faces a lawsuit.96
Whether such liability exists for inadvertent infringement
is an open question in patent law.9 7 Judge Gajarsa, in a
concurring opinion, wrote:
This [patented] compound raises a question similar to one
that might arise when considering the invention of a fertile
plant or a genetically engineered organism, capable of
reproduction, released into the wild. Consider, for example,
what might happen if the wind blew fertile, genetically
modified blue corn protected by a patent, from the field of a
single farmer into neighboring cornfields. The harvest from
those fields would soon contain at least some patented blue
corn mixed in with the traditional public domain yellow
corn-thereby infringing the patent. The wind would
continue to blow, and the patented crops would spread
throughout the continent, thereby turning most (if not all)
North American corn farmers into unintentional, yet
inevitable, infringers. 98

Although Judge Gajarsa believed no liability should be
found, the majority avoided addressing this issue, leaving it
open for another court to consider. For now, liability for the
drift farmer is still a threat.
Drift farmers find the threat of liability quite real. In
Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co.,99 a
group of organic and non-organic farmers who do not want to
grow or use GM crops or sell GM seed filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration that they are not
infringing Monsanto's patents when the GM seed inevitably
contaminates the plaintiffs' non-GM crops. JOO The farmers fear
96. To opponents of GMO technology, this drift of GMO traits onto others'
land and crop property has been characterized as "genetic pollution." Kilman &
Carroll, supra note 91, at A3.
97. Chris Holman, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association Et al. v.
Monsanto; The Public Patent Foundation Takes on Agricultural Biotechnology,
HOLMAN'S BIOTECH IP BLOG (June
1, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://
holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2011_06_01_archive.html ("To my knowledge,
this issue has never been directly addressed by the courts.").
98. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1360-61
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
99. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d
544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), a(f'd, 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
100. Id. at 547-48.
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that the inadvertent growth of GM plants could trigger
liability. IOI Although Monsanto declared that its policy is "not
to exercise [its] patent rights over inadvertently acquired trace
amounts of patented seed or traits,"102 Monsanto refused to
respond to a request that it expressly waive any claim for
patent infringement against the plaintiffs.103 Unsatisfied and
still fearful that they could be liable for infringement, the
farmers filed suit. 104 The Federal Circuit recently affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the case because it failed to satisfy
the case or controversy requirement.105

b. Saving Seed and Replanting
Farmers who grow GM crops, save some of the seed, and
replant it during the next growing season may be committing
patent infringement. The saving-seed-and-replanting conduct
applies to all three categories of farmers and is the most
common subject of cases being brought by Monsanto.106 In
particular, Monsanto asserts that saving and replanting the
GM seed infringes the patentee's exclusive right to make and
use the patented technology.107
The drift farmer who grows the crop, saves some of the
seed, and replants it during the next growing season is
infringing patented technology. This is because GM seeds are
being used by the farmer to grow the crops, and because the
GM seeds are self-replicating, new generations of GM seed are
made by the farmer. All of this is done without a license from
Monsanto to the drift farmer. One example is Percy
Schmeiser.108 Schmeiser claimed that GM seeds from

IOI. Id. at 549.
102. Id.
I 03. Id. at 549-50.
I 04. Id. at 550.
105. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
106. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff'd,
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph,
382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, No. 4:09-CV-1628
(CEJ), 2011 WL 5330674 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011); Monsanto Canada, Inc. v.
Schmeiser, [2004] 1S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
107. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
108. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 930, 937. For a full recitation of the facts in
Schmeiser, see supra note 77.
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neighboring farms drifted onto his farm.109 He took advantage
of the situation by harvesting the resulting GM plants, saving
the seeds they produced, and using them in the next growing
season.110 To be sure, Schmeiser is not as sympathetic as the
organic farmers who actively avoid having their crops
contaminated by GM plants because, as the court stated,
Schmeiser had reason to know that his crop had been polluted
with GM seed. 11 1 Nonetheless, because Schmeiser never
purchased the seed or agreed to a restrictive license
agreement, 11 2 he appears only to have taken advantage of
naturally occurring processes or processes put in motion by
others.113 Under this set of facts, he was involuntary thrust
into a situation where his field was polluted with GM seed; it
was how he reacted (actively cultivating the GM seed) that was
problematic.114
The direct-purchasing farmer infringes the patent by
saving and replanting GM seed. While the direct-purchasing
farmer has permission to use the GM seed, the license
agreement imposes various restrictions on farmers, including
prohibiting them from saving the GM seed for replanting.115
Thus, replanting the second-generation GM seed infringes the
patentee's right to make and use the patented technology.116
An example of a direct-purchasing farmer who saved GM seed
and replanted it is presented in the case of Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling. 117 McFarling purchased GM soybean seeds in 1998
and signed the license agreement.118 In violation of the
agreement, McFarling saved seeds from the 1998 crop and

109. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 937.
110. Id. at 930, 937.
111. Id. at 933-34.
112. Id. at 912.
113. Id. at 933-34 (discussing defendant's position that the GM seed "may
have been derived from Roundup Ready seed that blew onto or near Schmeiser's
land, and was then collected from plants that survived after Schmeiser sprayed
Roundup herbicide around the power poles and in the ditches along the roadway
bordering four of his fields").
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying note 82.
116. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, No. 4:09-CV-1628 (CEJ), 2011
WL 5330674 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011); see also 35 U.S.C. § 27l(a) (2012).
117. McFarling, 488 F.3d at 976.
118. Id.
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replanted them in 1999.1 19 In 1999, he saved the GM seeds and
replanted them in 2000. 120 Monsanto sued McFarling for
infringing its patents, and the court granted Monsanto's
motion for summary judgment as to liability.121
Bowman u. Monsanto, Co. exemplifies the indirect
purchasing farmer who infringes on patent-protected seed lines
by saving and replanting GM seed without signing a new
license agreement. 12 2 Bowman purchased commodity seed from
a grain elevator, "a mixture of undifferentiated seeds harvested
from various sources," which may contain GM seed.123 Bowman
saved the seeds resulting from his commodity-based crops and
replanted them in subsequent years.12 4 As a result, Monsanto
sued Bowman for patent infringement, and the court granted
summary judgment and awarded Monsanto $84,456.20.125
Finding that the saving and replanting of seeds is patent
infringement has an additional consequence-the law is
threatening a basic component of post-nomadic agriculture.126
Over time, farmers have developed techniques for naturally
selecting and perpetuating desirable traits, such as resistance
to drought or pests and plants that produce higher yields.127
The impulse to save seed is encoded in the farming
community's collective memory. 12 8 Today, farmers in the
United States carry on the tradition, saving seed from their
best plants from year-to-year, to produce "locally-adapted seed
varieties." 129 Saving seed also provides farmers-and thus our
food supply-with independence, by "ensur[ing] sufficient

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 976-77.
122. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff'd, 133 S. Ct.
1761 (2013); see also supra notes 40-4 7 and accompanying text.
123. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345-46. Mr. Bowman had previously been a direct
purchasing farmer, but complied with the terms of the license agreement. Id. at
1345.
124. Id. at 1345-46.
125. Id. at 1346.
126. Ma, supra note 30, at 694-95 (seed saving is "a longstanding agricultural
technique whereby farmers procure and plant first-generation seeds, then save
future-generation seed for successive replanting"); Jeremy P. Oczek, Note, In the
Aftermath of the "Terminator" Technology Controversy: Intellectual Property
Protections for Genetically Engineered Seed and the Right to Save and Replant
Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627, 647 (2000).
127. Oczek, supra note 126, at 647.
128. Ma, supra note 30, at 700.
129. Oczek, supra note 126, at 629.
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growing materials for future seasons."130 Despite centuries of
tradition of replanting seed, because GM seed replicates, this
activity has become an expensive violation of the law.13I
Moreover, "[t]here is no harvesting system in place in the world
that is capable of containing all the seeds produced on a plot of
land."132 Greater than 1,000 seeds per acre will remain in any
given farming field; these seeds will germinate naturally the
following season.133 When these residual seeds are GM strains,
the resulting so-called "volunteer plants" must be controlled. 134
Mitigation through chemical treatment (an option unavailable
to organic farmers) costs anywhere between $1 to $1.31 per
acre for GM canola to $4.07 per acre for GM wheat.135

c.

Saving and Selling Seed

The final activity that may cause farmers to infringe
Monsanto's patents is saving the GM seed and selling it to
others. 136 There are two types of sales that may occur. First is
selling the seed for planting purposes, often referred to as
brown bag sales.137 Second is selling the seed for other
purposes, such as for food (e.g., kernels of corn consumed by
animals or humans respectively). 138 Both types of sales may
implicate the patentee's exclusive right to sell or offer to sell
the patented invention. 139 Neither the drift farmer nor the
indirect-purchasing farmer has permission from Monsanto to
grow the patented GM crops, much less sell them. As a result,
they do not have the ability to sell the seeds or plants for
130. Ma, supra note 30, at 701.
131. See infra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
132. Smyth et al., supra note 71, at 538.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. (calculated using mitigation costs to Canadian farmers). Costs
converted from Canadian dollars to U.S. dollars using average daily bid rate for
June 2002 of CAD$0.6571 from historical exchange rate data. See OANDA,
www.oanda.com (Feb. 6, 2013).
136. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 890 F. Supp. 2d 729, 733 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
137. Id. at 734 (discussing a $6.3 million award for infringing brown bag sales);
Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811 n.1 (D.S.C. 2009) ("Brown
bag seed refers to the practice of a farmer buying commercial seed, planting the
seed, harvesting the crop, cleaning the harvested crop seed and then replanting
the saved seed or selling the seed to other farmers.").
138. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff'd,
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
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replanting or any other purpose.
The direct-purchasing farmers are a bit different. They
have entered into a license agreement with Monsanto, and, as
described above, the license prohibits selling the GM seed to
others for planting or saving it for planting beyond the current
season. 140 As a result, the direct-purchasing farmer who sells
GM seeds for use as food is participating in an authorized
activity and, thus, is not infringing the license.141
In sum, the widespread use of GM technology in United
States' agriculture has had a powerful effect on farmers. GM
seeds are generally licensed for single seasons, and unused
seed cannot be reused in subsequent seasons without an
additional license fee.142 In patent cases filed by Monsanto,
courts have found a substantial number of defendants liable for
infringement and have forced them to pay extraordinary
damages. 143
II.

EXAGGERATED REMEDIES FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT

Breach of contract damages are meant to compensate non
breaching parties by giving them the benefit of their bargain
and nothing more.144 Contract damages are focused on the
particular individuals who are parties to a contract, and
damages are consequently limited in scope. 145 Courts are not
supposed to award contract damages "to punish the party in
breach or to serve as an example to others ..." 146 As a result,

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1344-45.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1344-45.
See infra Part II.
Adams v. Lindblad Travel, Inc., 730 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
that where one party breaches a contract, damages are measured by asking,
"[What] is the amount necessary to put the plaintiff in the same economic position
he would have been in had the defendant fulfilled his contract."). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979) ("Judicial remedies under
the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following
interests of a promisee: (a) his 'expectation interest,' which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed....").
145. Prolific legal scholar Grant Gilmore argued, "The [Holmes-Williston]
theory seems to have been dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no one should
be liable to anyone for anything. Since the ideal was not attainable, the
compromise solution was to restrict liability within the narrowest possible limits."
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 355 cmt. a (1979).
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windfalls are prohibited, 147 and punitive damages are generally
not recoverable. 14 8 Compare tort damages, which seek to fully
compensate the injured party for the injury received 149 but also
have a societal dimension. 150 In particular, tort damages serve
the purposes of compensating the injured party, punishing
wrongdoers, and deterring wrongful conduct.151
Patent infringement is generally thought of as a tort. 152
The remedies for infringement are tort-like in that they provide
for
"damages
adequate
to
compensate
for
the
infringement...." 15 3 As the Federal Circuit held in Rite-Hite
Corp. u. Kelley Co., "while the statutory text states tersely that
the patentee receive 'adequate' damages [to compensate for the
infringement], the Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean
that 'adequate' damages should approximate those damages
that will fully compensate the patentee for infringement."154
Yet the Patent Act's prov1s10ns on remedies also
contemplate contractual damages.155 The Patent Act places a
floor on the amount of compensation, providing that it shall be
"in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer." 156 Thus, even in the absence of
actual harm to the patentee, 15 7 the patentee may still recover a
reasonable royalty that tries to replicate a license agreement
and fee between the patentee and infringer. 158 The reasonable

147. Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 146 (Del. 2009).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 355 cmt. a (1979).
149. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (measuring tort damages by asking, "[H]ad the tortfeasor not
committed the wrong, what would have been the financial position of the person
wronged?").
150. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Abbott Furnace Co., 972 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2009) (citing Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 486-87 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007)); Ilkhchooyi v. Best, 37 Cal. App. 4th 395, 412 (1995) ("Tort damages are
designed to vindicate social policy and to compensate the victim for injury
suffered....").
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
152. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("[P]atent infringement is a continuing tort ...."); N. Am. Philips Corp. v.
Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
153. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
154. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983)).
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
156. Id.
157. For example, the patentee may not actually manufacture the patented
product. In such a case, there are no lost sales from the infringement.
158. See Love, supra note 26, at 913.
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royalty can be determined in one of two ways: (1) using an
established royalty as a proxy for the reasonable royalty, or (2)
using a hypothetical negotiation model. 159
As discussed below, courts in GM seed cases have rejected
the established royalty measure and instead follow the
hypothetical negotiation measure. 160 But in doing so, they have
tried to fully compensate the patentee under a tort paradigm,
which allows for deterrence and punishment.161 This leads to
exaggerated damages 162 and, because the infringing farmer is
perceived as engaging in a tort, often injunctive relief.163
This Part will first describe how courts have consistently
rejected the established royalty method of calculating
reasonable royalties. 164 Next, it will discuss how courts
calculating reasonable royalties under the hypothetical
negotiation method have erroneously inflated these royalty
amounts. 165 Finally, it will illustrate how courts have
compounded the damage calculation problem by enjoining
farmers from future infringement.166

159. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling, USA,
Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
160. See infra Parts II.A. and 11.B.
161. Id.
162. See Love, supra note 26, at 916; Doug Lichtman, Understanding The
Rand Commitment, 47 Hous. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2010). As pointed out by
Professor Lichtman, courts do not award "reasonable" royalties in patent
infringement cases. Id. at 1035. "Quite the opposite, when a court decides that a
valid patent has been infringed, the court typically imposes a remedy the net
value of which clearly exceeds the value of any deal the parties would have made
had they negotiated a license prior to the infringement." Id. The reasons for courts
to award exaggerated royalties are several: (1) it encourages infringers to settle
rather than face an award of exaggerated royalties, (2) it discourages patent
infringement in the first place by making it cheaper to agree to a reasonable
patent ex ante than to wait and face an award of exaggerated damages, and (3) it
compensates the patent holder for the time and effort of proving that the patent is
valid and has been infringed. Id. at 1036-39.
163. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. &

OFF. Soc'V 631, 654 (2007) ("One clear conclusion, based on the data,
is that most courts continue to grant permanent injunctions for patent
infringement....").
164. See infra Part II.A.
165. See infra Part 11.B.
166. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Rejecting Established Royalties
A reasonable royalty can be based on an established
royalty. 167 An established royalty is what others actually pay
for the right to use the patent.168 It is a proper measure
"[w]hen the patentee has consistently licensed others to engage
in conduct comparable to the defendant's at a uniform royalty,
that royalty is taken as established and indicates the terms
upon which the patentee would have licensed the defendant's
use of the invention."169 This approach has the advantage of
"remov[ing] the need to guess at the terms to which parties
would hypothetically agree," as is required when the
hypothetical negotiation model is used to determine a
reasonable royalty.170 In the GM seed context, farmers have
argued that the Technology Fee is the established royalty.171
The Technology Fee is the portion of the invoiced price
equivalent to licensing the GM seed in that bag for the present
growing season.172 In the late 1990s and into 2000, the
Technology Fee was approximately $5.00 or $6.50 per bag of
soybean seed. 173 In 2003, it was $7.75 per bag.174
Despite the Technology Fee's existence, it has consistently
been rejected as an established royalty in the GM seed context,
at least in cases where the farmer is accused of saving seed
from year to year. 175 While farmers argue that the Technology
Fee is an established royalty, the courts counter that the
Technology Fee is limited to the use of the GM seed in that
particular bag for the present growing season only.176 The
167. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling, USA,
Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
168. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
169. McFarling, 488 F.3d at 979.
170. See id. at 981.
171. See id. at 978, 979.
172. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
173. See Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
McFarling, 488 F.3d at 976; Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939
(E.D. Mo. 2003).
174. See Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Monsanto stopped listing the Technology Fee separately on invoices for Roundup
Ready seed in 2002. Schoenbaum v. Monsanto Co., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 n.4
(2007).
175. See, e.g., David, 516 F.3d at 1018 (noting that "the [T]echnology [F]ee is
not an established royalty for the infringing act of saving seed").
176. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1383.
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courts reason that a farmer who was negotiating for use of one
bag of seed and use of the seed produced by that one bag of
seed would pay more than the traditional Technology Fee.1 77
The Technology Fee and the license that would be required to
cover the infringing material are not the same; the second
would be a broader license and hence more expensive.178
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph provides an example of a court
rejecting the Technology Fee as an established royalty.1 79
Recall that "[i]n 1988, Ralph purchased 264 fifty-pound bags of
soybean seed containing the patented Roundup Ready
biotechnology." 180 Ralph infringed Monsanto's patent by saving
seed for use during the next planting season and Monsanto
sued Ralph for patent infringement. 181 The court rejected
Ralph's argument that the "standard Technology Fee that
Monsanto charges all farmers is 'the most established royalty
[that] patent infringement litigation has ever seen,"' 182 and
that the court should take the total number of bags of seed he
recovered over the two years and multiply that by the per-bag
Technology Fee (i.e., (696 + 438) multiplied by $5/bag =
$6,170).183 The court found that Ralph's use of the patent was
broader than what the Technology Fee would cover. 184 The
court also seemed concerned that simply using the Technology
Fee as an established royalty would not result in adequate
deterrence; if it awarded only $6, 170 in damages, future
farmers would have no incentive to follow the law. 185 Future
farmers could infringe the patent and would pay the royalty fee

177. See id. at 1381. Even a single bag of the soybean seed improperly acquired
"could therefore, by a conservative estimate, produce hundreds of thousands of
bags of seed (i.e., 70 x 70 x 70 = 343,000) over the course of just three growing
seasons." Id. Each soybean plant is capable of producing 55 seeds, because each
plant produces on average 22 pods, and each pod produces 2.5 seeds. See LEE &
HERBEK, supra note 11, at 2.
178. See Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1383 (rejecting Ralph's argument that the
"standard [T]echnology [F]ee that Monsanto charges all farmers is 'the most
established royalty patent infringement litigation has ever seen,"' and agreeing
with Monsanto that Ralph's "infringing use extended well beyond the licensed
planting of a commercial crop for a single growing season.").
179. See id. at 1377.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1377-78.
182. Id. at 1383.
183. See id. at 1379.
184. See id. at 1379, 1384.
185. Id.
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only if they got caught.186
Such reasoning ignores the other incentives farmers have
to act lawfully and pay the Technology Fee.187 First, this
reasoning overlooks the Patent Act's expressly designed tool to
discourage blatant infringement-the ability to award treble
damages for willful infringement.188 A farmer who decides to
deliberately use the GM seed without paying the Technology
Fee "would almost certainly qualify as a willful infringer and
face up to treble damages...."189 In Ralph, a reasonable
royalty of $6,170 would have been trebled to $18,510 for
deterrent and punishment effect.190
Second, farmers will want to avoid a preliminary
injunction, which would prevent them from growing and selling
the infringing crops. 191 Taking the risk that one's farm will be
temporarily shut down "may, in many cases, be the most
powerful infringement deterrent of all."192
Third, farmers will want to avoid the cost of patent
infringement litigation. 193 Not only would farmers have their
own costs (attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and lost time),
but the Patent Act permits courts to award attorneys' fees to
prevailing
parties
in
"exceptional
cases." 194
Willful
infringement is one factor courts consider in determining
whether a case is exceptional. 195 Patent litigation is notoriously
expensive, l96 which likely provides a strong incentive to avoid
186. Love, supra note 26, at 919 (quoting Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d
1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
187. See id. at 924.
188. Id. at 925; 35 U.S. C. § 284 (2012) (stating "the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed").
189. Love, supra note 26, at 926.
190. See Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1379; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). In Monsanto Co. u.
Roeder, the court suggested this logical approach, but Monsanto argued that such
a limitation would not be proper and the court relented. Monsanto Co. v. Roeder,
No. 07-01422S, 2009 WL 4907014, at *11 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Dec. 14, 2009).
191. Love, supra note 26, at 927. But see Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (concluding that a preliminary injunction was
inappropriate despite a likelihood of success in showing the Department of
Agriculture violated the National Environmental Policy Act); Ctr. for Food Safety
v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2011).
192. Love, supra note 26, at 927.
193. See id. at 928.
194. Id. at 927; 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
195. See Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 184
(Fed. Cir.1994).
196. See, e.g., Love, supra note 26, at 928 (citing AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW Ass'N,
REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 25-26).
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infringement. Yet, despite these built-in deterrents, the courts
have rejected the established royalty method and opted for a
more deterrent- and punishment-oriented approach.

B. Inflating the Hypothetical Negotiation
Where an established royalty cannot be determined, the
reasonable royalty may be based "upon the supposed result of
hypothetical negotiations between the plaintiff and
defendant."197 This hypothetical negotiation method seeks to
determine the terms of the license agreement the parties would
have reached had they negotiated at arm's length when
infringement began. 198 In the GM seed context, to estimate
what the farmer would have been willing to pay, courts focus
on the farmer's estimated economic benefits enjoyed. 199 This
197. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling, USA,
Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft
Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (citing
Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 297 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
198. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating "jury
was instructed in the factors set forth in Georgia-Pacific for determination of a
reasonable royalty"). The Georgia-Pacific factors include (1) royalties the patentee
has received for licensing the patent to others; (2) rates paid by the licensee for
the use of comparable patents; (3) the nature and scope of the license (exclusive or
nonexclusive, restricted or nonrestricted by territory or product type); (4) any
established policies or marketing programs by the licensor to maintain its patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or granting licenses under
special conditions to maintain the monopoly; (5) the commercial relationship
between the licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors; (6) the
effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the
licensee; (7) the duration of the patent and license term; (8) the established
profitability of the product made under the patent, including its commercial
success and current popularity; (9) the utility and advantages of the patent
property over old modes or devices; (10) the nature of the patented invention and
the benefits to those who have used the invention; (11) the extent to which the
infringer has used the invention and the value of that use; (12) the portion of
profit or of the selling price that may be customary in that particular business to
allow for use of the invention or analogous inventions; (13) the portion of the
realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as opposed to its non·
patented elements; (14) the opinion testimony of qualified experts; and (15) the
results of a hypothetical negotiation between the licensor and licensee. Ga. Pac.
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
199. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming
$40 royalty per bag of seed where farmer "sav[ed] $31 to $61 per bag of seed");
Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, No. 4:09-CV-1628 (CEJ), 2011 WL 5330674, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) (awarding a royalty based "on the estimated economic benefits
enjoyed by defendants...."); see Love, supra note 26, at 916-18 (discussing how
the court in McFarling based damages on what "the defendant has gained or lost
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makes sense. A farmer would certainly consider potential
economic gains when deciding the proper payment for the right
to use the patented seed.
However, courts also entertain considerations that have no
place in a hypothetical negotiation, such as deterring future
behavior. Awarding a reasonable royalty for patent
infringement, measured by an established royalty or a
hypothetical negotiation, is grounded in a contract-based
approach to damages. 20° As such, deterrence should not be a
goal.20 1 One court-despite a lack of evidence supporting this
allegation-opined that the farmer may effectively go into
business against Monsanto:
Because one Roundup Ready® soybean seed is capable, on
average, of producing thirty to forty identical second
generation seed, the farmer is capable of selling forty-times
the seed originally purchased. Given enough acreage, a
farmer purchasing 1,000 bags of Roundup Ready® seed
would be capable of bin-running or brown bagging
39,304,000 bags within four years. Thus Monsanto would
only be willing to accept a royalty commensurate with the
risk that a farmer could effectively become a direct Roundup
Ready® soybean competitor to Monsanto in such a short
time period.202

To deter such hypothetical competition, the court found
that an inflated reasonable royalty would be appropriate.203
by his unlawful acts").
200. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.
v. Maersk Drilling, USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
201. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
202. Monsanto Co. v. Byrd, No.7:99-CV-154-Fl, 2000 WL 33952260, at *6
(E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2000) (quoting Daesch Aff., Oct. 4, 2000). If Monsanto priced its
seed based upon the assumption that each licensee would be a potential
competitor, the price would be prohibitively expensive.
203. Id. at *7. Further, while the court may triple the reasonable royalty under
section 284, some courts bring punishment into the calculation well before the
treble damages phase, that is to say, they consider punishment in determining a
reasonable royalty. See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir.
1996). One court told jurors that they should include in their calculation of
reasonable royalties "other factors that might warrant higher damages," and then
tripled the reasonable royalty that the jurors came up with. See Love, supra note
26, at 919 (discussing Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1109). On appeal, the Federal Circuit
held that it was:
[N]ot an abuse of discretion for the district court to instruct the jury to
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However, the need to deter the farmer's competition with
Monsanto seems less critical, when one considers that
Monsanto is a company with assets in excess of $20 billion.204
Realistically, the farmer has no hope of competing in the
capital-intensive world of GM seed production.
Further, the fact that the courts are incorporating
deterrence into their award of damages can be clearly inferred
from the damage amounts.205 Indeed, they are "nudging the
reasonable royalty formulation further and further away from
the traditional willing licensor-willing licensee negotiation."206
An additional factor underlying all of the outcomes above
is that in applying the hypothetical-negotiation method to
determine a reasonable royalty, courts refuse to consider that
the farmer and Monsanto are partners in an arm's-length
negotiation. The courts find that Monsanto can refuse to
negotiate and thus abandon the essential assumption of a
willing licensor-willing licensee. 207 By rejecting the assumption
of a willing licensor-willing licensee the court can abandon
economic reality208 and embark on a journey serving deterrence
and punishment rather than just compensation. Of course, the
Patent Act already includes specific provisions to deter and
punish-courts can award treble damages for willful

award in two separate amounts-first ... the royalty that two willing
parties would negotiate . . . and second . . . the increase in the
damages ... based on other relevant factors-what courts had previously
instructed jurors to consolidate into a single damages award.
See id. (quoting Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1110).
204. Monsanto Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18 (Oct. 19, 2012).
205. See infra notes 213-219 and accompanying text; see also Monsanto Co. v.
Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815 (D.S.C. 2009) ("[The damage expert's]
analysis is based upon the considerations outlined in Georgia-Pacific and focuses
on the commercial success of Roundup Ready® seed technology and the
importance of Monsanto protecting its patent rights.").
206. Love, supra note 26, at 920.
207. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n. 13 (Fed. Cir. 1995), "(t]he
hypothetical negotiation is often referred to as a 'willing licensor/willing licensee'
negotiation. However, this is an inaccurate, and even absurd, characterization
when, as here, the patentee does not wish to grant a license.").
208. Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for Rand Royalties in the Shadow of Patent
Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 899 n.41 (2011) (citing Thomas F. Cotter,
Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151,
1185-86 n.163 (2009) (noting that "recent cases have highlighted that, as a legal
matter, reasonable royalty awards may exceed the amount the parties would have
agreed to" in the hypothetical negotiation and declaring that such "decisions make
no economic sense")).
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infringement209 and attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases."210
Because such provisions are already included in the Patent Act,
this makes an inflated reasonable royalty even more
inappropriate.
The results are telling. The court can find a reasonable
royalty higher than the farmer's anticipated profits, despite the
fact that "no sane farmer would ever negotiate a royalty in
excess of his anticipated profits."21 I Again, Monsanto Co. u.
Ralph is illustrative. Once the court decided not to be bound by
the established royalty of $5 per bag, or even a royalty that
would be reached in a hypothetical negotiation, it settled on
"$55.04 per bag for the 796 bags of soybean seed that Ralph
saved for planting in 1999, [and] $52.12 per bag for the 438
bags of soybean seed he saved for 2000."2 12 The damages for
infringing the soybean patent were $66,639 and subsequently
trebled to $199,918.2 13 Notice that there are two levels of
deterrence and punishment here: the original inflated royalty
of $55.04 per bag and the trebling of that amount to $165.12
per bag.214 Other courts have moved even higher.215 Indeed,
this type of inflated damage is repeated in case after case,
leading to judgments against farmers in the amount of
$3,052,800;216
$2,586,325;2 17
$2,410,206;2 18
and
$1,105,102.50.219
209. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). Section 284 does not expressly require willfulness,
but courts have held that a showing of willfulness is sufficient. Mark A. Lemley &
Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1085, 1087 n.3 (2003).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 285; see also Jon E. Wright, Willful Patent Infringement and
Enhanced Damages-Evolution and Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 97, 102
(2001) ("[C]ourts used the treble damages provision to punish infringers for
deliberate acts of infringement. The courts also used the available discretion to
punish bad faith business tactics.").
21 I. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1384.
212. Id. at 1379.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see supra Part II.A., for the reasoning behind treble damages.
215. Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 815-18 (D.S.C. 2009)
(awarding $100 per bag of soybean seed plus enhanced damages).
216. THE CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO V. U.S. FARMERS 33 (2005)
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Anderson, No. 4:01:CV-01749 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2003)).
217. Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Dawson, No. 98-CV-2004 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19,
2001)).
218. Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, No. 02-MC-26, 2003 WL 25276984 (E.D.
Mo. July 9, 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
219. Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, No. 4:09-CV-1628 (CEJ), 2011 WL 5330674, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011).
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As a reference, in 2011, the median household income for
farms specializing in cash grains such as corn or soybeans was
a mere $76,301.220 In 2010, seed costs for these two grains as a
percent of gross crop-derived income per acre amounted to 11
percent-12 percent for conventional seeds and 22 percent-23
percent for branded GM seeds.22 1 When examined in terms of
net returns per acre, the percentage grew to 18 percent-24
percent for conventional seeds and 35 percent-51 percent for
branded GM seeds.2 22 This means that a simple trebling of
these costs by the court for branded GM seeds would amount to
105 percent-153 percent of a farmer's total crop-derived net
income for the year, and says nothing of the impact of the
trebling of seed-bag costs that have been inflated by up to
twenty times market rates before trebling. By any standard,
negotiated royalty rates that could consume upwards of twenty
years' worth of a farmer's total household income go far beyond
reasonable compensation and certainly would never be
construed as a logical position on the part of a potential
licensee in a willing licensor-willing licensee negotiation.

C. Injunctions
Despite the fact that courts award a reasonable royalty
based on the assumption that the farmer was negotiating for
the use of one bag of seed for the year of the infringement and
use of the seed produced by that one bag of seed (i.e., the court
is determining a reasonable royalty based on infringement this
year, infringement next year, and into the future),223 Monsanto
often seeks an injunction against the future activity that the
reasonable royalty is intended to cover. As one defendant
argued:
The absurdity of the Plaintiffs position is [clear when one

220. U.S. Dep't of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Farm Household Income: Median
Farm Household Income up in 2011 and Forecast Higher in 2012 (2013),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartld=31715.
221. CHARLES BENBROOK, THE ORGANIC CENTER, THE MAGNITUDE AND
IMPACTS OF THE BIOTECH AND ORGANIC SEED PRICE PREMIUM 6 (2009), available

at http://kohalacenter.org/publicseedinitiative/images/seedpricepremium. pdf.
222. Id.
223. Even a single bag of the soybean seed improperly acquired could produce
hundreds of thousands of seeds over just three growing seasons. See supra note
177 and accompanying text.

2014]

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

345

considers that the court is awarding an inflated reasonable
royalty of] $427,291.00 per brown bag seed sold. Obviously,
the plaintiff is attempting to recover a mandatory ten-year
license in which the Defendant is presumed to grow and sell
seed as a competitor against the Plaintiff for ten years. Yet
the Defendant is prohibited from doing so by this Court's
[injunction].224
The court rejected the foregoing argument and permitted
Monsanto to proceed to trial and argue that an inflated
reasonable royalty is a proper amount of damages.22 5 In
addition to these inflated damages, Monsanto also sought
injunctive relief.2 26 This "result[s] in a windfall for the plaintiff
because the damages are based on future infringements
notwithstanding existence of the injunction preventing such
infringements."227 This practice is repeated across cases.228
The impropriety of this practice was recognized long ago in
a trade secret case where the Ninth Circuit explained that "[t]o
enjoin future sales and at the same time make an award based
on future profits from the prohibited sales would result in
duplicat[ed] and inconsistent relief."229 In addition, inflating
damages to compensate for future infringement while enjoining
the defendant from future infringement directly contradicts
one of the four required elements for injunctive relief-"that
remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for [the irreparable] injury."230 If monetary

224. Monsanto Co. v. Byrd, No. 7:99-CV-154-Fl, 2000 WL 33952260, at *6
(E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2000).
225. Id. at *7.
226. Id. at *2.
227. Id. at *7.
228. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, No. 4:09-CV-1628 (CEJ), 2011 WL
5330674, at *4, *6 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) (awarding exaggerated damages and an
injunction); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, No. 4:00CV84 CDP, (E.D. Mo. June 23,
2005) (awarding an inflated reasonable royalty of $40 per bag and granting a
permanent injunction), aff'd, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
229. Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 144
(9th Cir. 1965).
230. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The fourpart test is that the:
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
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damages, in the form of inflated reasonable royalties, are being
awarded to Monsanto, then these damages are necessarily
adequate to compensate for the injury.231
In addition to the relief being duplicative and failing to
satisfy the four-part test for injunctive relief, there is the
human dimension of the hardship visited upon farmers by
preliminary and permanent injunctions. Farmers will generally
be subject to a preliminary injunction, which effectively
prevents them from farming during the pendency of the
action.232 And even if farmers pay damages for past wrongs and
are willing to enter into license agreements for future planting
seasons, Monsanto may not allow the farmers to do so.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in
McFarling that the permanent injunction against unlicensed
use of GM seed did not require Monsanto to "license its
technology to Mr. McFarling if it chooses not to." 233 In short,
McFarling was prevented from earning a living during the
pendency and after the conclusion of the case and faces a
judgment of $375,000.234
In sum, because the infringing farmers face damages based
on a tort model, they are subject to damages that are inflated
for deterrent or even punitive effect. The typical farmer sued by
Monsanto for patent infringement faces a "reasonable" royalty
that is more than ten times the established royalty. In Ralph,
while the typical farmer paid a royalty of $5.00 per bag,
Monsanto was awarded damages of $55.04 per bag, tripled to
$165.12 per bag.235 The possibility of injunctive relief
disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id.

231. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 572-73,
582-83 (E.D. Va. 2007) (holding that the patentee's willingness to enter into a
license agreement with third parties and the defendant negating the existence of
an irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at law).
232. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
233. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d. 1374 (Fed Cir. 2004) ("[T]he court entered a
permanent injunction prohibiting Ralph's 'current and future purchase,
acquisition, making, use, sale, offers to sell, brokering, transfer, cleaning, and/or
reconditioning ... of any seed containing Monsanto's patented biotechnology ...
[or] planting, moving, collecting, transferring, or obtaining, in any manner, any
patented biotechnology in [his] possession, or under [his] control, wherever
situated,' and ordering him to inventory and produce all patented biotechnology in
his possession to Monsanto.").
234. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973.
235. Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1379.
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compounds this problem by removing the farmer's ability to
make a living.236 A solution to this problem is necessary. The
legal playing field between Monsanto and farmers needs to be
leveled. Drawing from the law regarding standard setting
organizations (SSOs) and the practices of those involved in
SSOs, we propose to level the playing field with the help of an
implied license. An implied license will shift the paradigm from
one based in tort to one based in contract. Punishing the
farmer will give way to the more laudable goal of compensating
Monsanto.
III. IMPLIED LICENSES VIA DE FACTO STANDARD-ESSENTIAL

PATENTS
This Part proposes a way for a court to deal with a case
involving a patentee seeking redress for unlicensed use of GM
seed technology. The court should first determine whether the
patent covering the GM seed technology meets the criteria to
be classified as a de facto standard-essential patent (de facto
SEP). If the patent can be classified as a de facto SEP, this
provides a basis for implying a license between the patentee
and the infringing farmer.237 The result will be that the
infringing farmer will pay a reasonable, rather than inflated,
royalty rate.238 By de facto SEP, we mean that certain
stringent conditions have been met that make infringing use of
the underlying technology all but impossible to avoid.239 Our
argument for determination of de facto SEP status for a
technology is an extension of the standard-essential patent
(SEP) designation, which plays a vital role in technological
fields by allowing other producers to build on the patented
technologies by paying a licensing fee.240 While SEP
designation traditionally takes place through formal standard
setting bodies, this Article argues that de facto SEP can be
determined by the court by analyzing whether three stringent
criteria, which reflect the peculiarities of seeds used in
236. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
23 7. For a detailed discussion of the three elements required to find

a de facto
SEP, see infra Part III.B. For a discussion of how this will result in an implied
license, see infra Part III.C.1.
238. See infra Parts III.C.l., III.C.2.
239. See infra Part III.B.
240. See Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in
Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 855-56 (2011).
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farming, have been satisfied.241 By acknowledging the potential
for a de facto SEP in the cases of some GM seed technology, an
implied license can be formed, which shifts the case from a tort
based patent infringement suit to a breach-of-contract
dispute. 242 As a result, this would alter the damages regime of
the case from one based in compensation, deterrence, and
punishment (a torts approach), to one based solely in
compensation (a contractual approach).243
This Part first defines standards and SEPs. It also
describes SSOs and how they permit industry standards to
flourish. 244 Next, the notions of SEPs are applied and extended
to the GM seed context and a three-part test for labeling GM
seeds as SEPs is set forth. 245 Finally, this Part describes how
conceptualizing GM seeds as SEPs can yield an implied license
between Monsanto and farmers, which will lead to reasonable,
rather than inflated, royalty rates and avoid the need to enjoin
farmers.2 46

A. Standard-Essential Patents and Standard Setting
Organizations
A standard, most often seen in technology-based
industries, is "any set of technical specifications that either
provides or is intended to provide a common design for a
product or process."247 Standards serve useful purposes
because they encourage interoperability, facilitate competition
in replacement parts, and even promote social welfare. 248
Standardization may arise in a number of ways.2 49 One
way is through SSOs.250 SSOs, which typically act to solve
interoperability problems, operate via their members to "create
standards that ensure that devices within a system will work
together and communicate with each other in standardized,

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See infra Part 111.B.
See infra Part 111.C.l.
See infra Part 111.C.2.
See infra Part Ill.A
See infra Part 111.B.
See infra Part 111.C.
Mark A Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002).
248. Id. at 1897.
249. Id. at 1898.
250. Id.
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predictable ways."2 51 Standards that are formed through SSOs
often entail bringing together multiple patented technologies
owned by different patentees under one standard.252 But
standards may also be formed around the technology of only
one specific patentee.253 As an example:
In the late 1970s, a firm called RSA obtained a number of

extremely strong patents covering the basic methods of
public key cryptography .... [T]he significance of RSA's
invention and the scope of its patents led to the adoption of
a number of specifications that required implementers to
seek a license from RSA. 254
The potential impact of a technology becoming a standard
improves both revenue generation and technological impact for
the intellectual property (IP) holder. 255 This positive impact
explains why firms will exert substantial effort on standards
development activity. 256 The result of this activity is that other
members of the industry are pressured to use the technology in
order to compete in the market; product offerings that do not
251. Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce
Standard-Essential Patents: Prepared Statement of the F. T. C. Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm'r of
the F.T.C.) [hereinafter Ramirez Statement].
252. Aija Elina Leiponen, Competing Through Cooperation: The Organization
of Standard Setting in Wireless Telecommunications, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1904, 1906
(2008).
253. Timothy Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for
Shared Technology Platforms, 102 AMER. ECON. REV. 305 (2012), available at
http:/!people. bu.edu/tsimcoe/documents/published/SSOCommittees_v3. pdf; Joseph
Farrell & Timothy Simcoe, Choosing the Rules for Consensus Standardization, 43
RAND J. OF ECON. 235 (2012), available at http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/
documents/published/ConsensusRules. pdf.
254. Timothy Simcoe, Open Standards and Intellectual Property Rights, in
OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 161, 174 (Henry Chesbrough
et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
255. Leiponen, supra note 252, at 1904 (notihg that "[c]ompanies that were
able to incorporate their patents in one of these standards may have been
receiving royalty revenue for more than 15 years"); Marc Rysman & Timothy
Simcoe, Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting
Organizations, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1920, 1921 (2008) (finding that technologies garner
a 19 percent and 47 percent increase in patent citations as a result of SSO
endorsement).
256. "In 2005 IBM spent an estimated $500 million-roughly 8.5% of its R&D
budget-on standards development." Rysman & Simcoe, supra note 255, at 1920
(citing Benjamin Chiao et al., The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An
Empirical Analysis. 54 RAND J. ECON. 905, 906 n.1 (2007)).
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adhere to the industry standard are less likely to be adopted by
consumers and may be viewed as suspect.257 Thus, one could
argue that a broad definition of an SEP is a patent necessary to
use the standard or a part thereof.2 58 SEPs as denominated by
SSOs are known as de jure standards. 259
Before SSOs adopt standards covered by SEPs, they
frequently require the owners of those patents to commit to
licensing
their
patents
under
reasonable
and
non
discriminatory (RAND) terms. 260 This is because adoption of an
SEP could endow the patent owner with disproportionate
market power and permit it to "extract unreasonably high
royalties from suppliers [and users] of standard-compliant
products and services."261 Requiring RAND licensing protects
adopters and users of the standard from paying extraordinarily
high fees when there are no realistic opportunities to produce
the product or provide the service without infringing the
patent.262
This
RAND
licensing
requirement
is
263
commonplace.
But not all standards are created by SSOs.264 De facto

257. W. B. Arthur, Competing Technologies: An Overview, in TECHNICAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 590, 590-607 (Giovanni Dosi. ed., Columbia
Univ. Press 1988). Technologies that have become standards garner increasing
returns to adoption from several sources, including learning by using (i.e., the
more it is used the more it is improved), network externalities (i.e., the more users
there are, the more likely adopters benefit from greater availability and variety of
related products (e.g., VHS tapes)), scale economies in production (i.e., price comes
down as production numbers increase), informational increasing returns (i.e.,
better known makes more attractive, especially to the risk averse), and
technological interrelatedness (i.e., supporting infrastructure is developed and
becomes difficult to dislodge (e.g., gas engines with gas stations)). Id.
258. 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY§ 35.1, at 35-7 (2d
ed. 2009); see also Ramirez Statement, supra note 251, at 4.
259. Ramirez Statement, supra note 251, at 4.
260. Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse,
51 IDEA 559, 571 (2011). Some SSOs, commentators, and courts use the phrase
"fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory'' or FRAND. There is no difference
between RAND and FRAND. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d
901, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("[t]he word 'fair' adds nothing to 'reasonable' and
'nondiscriminatory"').
261. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One
Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007)).
262. See Lim, supra note 260, at 571.
263. Lemley, supra note 247, at 1906 (''The most common condition was that IP
rights be licensed on 'reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms."').
264. Id. at 1899.
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standards may also emerge as a result of consumer
preference.265 If a de facto standard emerges and is covered by
a patent, then the patent becomes a de facto standard-essential
patent (de facto SEP). The owner of the de facto SEP, like the
owner of the de jure SEP, may have increased market power.
There should be no difference between the rights and
responsibilities that arise from the creation of a de jure SEP
and a de facto SEP. In particular, where patented technology
necessary for the satisfaction of a human need reaches SEP
status, a license should be implied between the patentee and
those users who cannot practicably fulfill the need without
infringing the patent. This type of implied license would, like
other licenses, be an affirmative defense.266 If established, this
implied license would remove the possibility of inflating
damages for deterrent or punitive effect and remove the
possibility of granting injunctions.
When applied to Monsanto's GM seed litigation, the
company is currently benefiting from the advantages of an SEP
without taking on any of the reciprocal responsibilities.
Specifically, Monsanto's technology has "become[ ] a de facto
standard . . . controlled by [Monsanto], [giving Monsanto]
significant power and control."267 Where a given technology
achieves standard-essential status without the determination
of an SSO, it is not bound by any of the mitigating agreements
that SSOs may put in place. These may include the agreement

265. Id.; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION 34 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
hearings/ip/222655.pdf (citing Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 633--34 (2002);
Daniel J. Gifford, Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the
Knowledge-Based Economy: Standards and Intellectual Property: Licensing
Terms: Some Comments 1 (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opp/intellect/020418danieljgifford.pdf (discussing the Windows operating system
as an example of a de facto standard chosen by the market)).
266. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872,
878 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[A]n implied license, like an express license, is a defense to
patent infringement... _ [The alleged infringer has] the burden of establishing the
existence of an implied license as an affirmative defense.").
267. Michael Chapin, Note, Sharing The Interoperability Ball On The Software
Patent Playground, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220, 233 (2008); see Pamela
Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1943, 1950 (2009) ("Privately developed interface designs can also become de
facto standards when the platforms for which they were designed become
successful in the marketplace.").

352

UNIVERSITY OF COWRADO I.AW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

to grant a license on RAND terms to anyone using the patented
technology on the part of the IP holder.268
It is clear from a review of cases involving GM seeds that
the courts are reluctant to force Monsanto to license its
patented technology to farmers.269 Given this, the narrowly
tailored proposal presented here creates an implied license
between the IP holder and the farmer only where certain strict
conditions are met. Specifically, the proposal limits application
of the de facto SEP model to cases where (1) the patent holder
has achieved dominance in a given field, (2) it is impracticable
to expect that a farmer could operate without infringing the
patent, and (3) the farmer is growing a crop used to meet a
basic human need. In the following Part, the elements for
recognition of a de facto SEP are further explained.

B. Establishing a De Facto SEP Regime for Genetically
Modified Technology
To succeed with the affirmative defense that a patent is a
de facto SEP and that an implied license is appropriate, the
farmer has the burden of establishing three elements. These
three elements are:
(1) Dominance: The patented technology has reached a
dominant position in the relevant crop market;
(2) Impracticability: Growing the relevant crop has become
impracticable (or impossible) without use of the
patented technology; and
(3) Basic Need: The crop is necessary to supplying a basic
need (food, shelter, or clothing).
Each element is explained below, along with how a farmer
could prove each element. Before doing so, it is important to
point out that the de facto SEP affirmative defense would not
apply to farmers who knowingly cultivate second-generation
GM seed for the primary purpose of selling it to other

268. Lemley, supra note 247, at 1906 (examining policies of SSOs and stating
that twenty-nine of thirty-six SSOs with IP licensing policies required members to
license their patents on RAND terms).
269. See supra Part II.C. and note 228 (describing cases where courts enjoin
farmers rather than permit continued use of the GM seed conditioned upon
payment of a set fee).
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farmers. 27 0 This "unclean hands" limitation would exclude
direct-purchasing farmers who seek to profit from selling
second-generation GM seeds and may also exclude drift and
indirect-purchasing farmers who seek to profit from the fact
that their fields now contain plants with GM seed. In short, the
proposal does not seek to legitimize a black market for
infringing GM seed. Instead, it attempts to minimize the harm
to farmers who are producing products to satisfy a basic human
need while trying to comply with the law.

1.

Dominance

The dominance element looks at whether the patented
technology has reached a dominant position in the relevant
crop market (the terms "dominance" and "significant market
power" are often used interchangeably in the literature). This
dominance may occur due to open competition, anticompetitive
behavior, lawful patent protection, tariffs, or other such
barriers to access. The specific question is: Does the firm
owning the patented technology have significant market
power? Antitrust law, which regularly assesses market power,
helps answer that question.271 The most commonly used
surrogate for determining market power is a system that
measures the market share and structure of the market.272
Measuring market share requires the market to be defined in
terms of the product and geography.273
The "product market" should be defined as the crop being
grown by the infringing farmer that is alleged to infringe the
patent. If the farmer grows soybeans and patented GM soybean
seeds drift into the farmer's field, then the product market is
soybean seeds. If the farmer grows cotton and patented GM
270. "Knowingly" includes acting with "willfull blindness." Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc., v. SEB, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
271. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981) (stating "[m]arket power is a key concept
in antitrust law. A finding of monopolization in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act requires an initial determination that the defendant has monopoly
power-a high degree of market power.").
272. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN 8. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 60 (2000). Market share creates the presumption of
market power. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 899 F.2d
951, 968 (10th Cir. 1990). Market structure is examined to see if the market share
is durable, as it would be in the presence of barriers to entry. See id.
273. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 272, at 61.
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cottonseeds are indirectly purchased from a commodities
dealer, then the product market is cottonseed. No distinction
should be made between GM seed and non-GM seed.
For geographic markets, in determining antitrust
violations, the general question to ask is where consumers look
when purchasing a product.2 74 As applied to the infringing
farmers, courts should look at where farmers in that
community go to purchase their seed for the relevant crop.
Although this could vary depending on the product and
consumers, the geographic market should be defined locally
rather than regionally or nationally.275 Ultimately, the court
determines the geographic scope, but it is anticipated that
resolution of this issue will be informed by expert witness
testimony and reports.
Once the market has been defined, market share must be
measured.276 Generally, market share is measured by
analyzing output within the market in one of three ways: (1) as
physical units sold, (2) as revenues as a percentage of all
physical units sold, or (3) as firm revenues.277 Once market
share has been established, it must be determined whether this
amount is sufficiently large to constitute dominance.2 78
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have long used measures of
market concentration in antitrust enforcement.2 79 Although
described in the context of horizontal mergers, the DOJ and
FTC evaluate dominance with the Herfindahl-Hirschman

274. Id. at 63.
275. "Farmers

typically buy their seed locally." Guanming Shi, Jean-Paul
Chavas and Kyle Stiegert, An Analysis of Bundle Pricing: The Case of The Corn
Seed Market, FSWP2008-0l, at 9 (2008), available at http://aae.wisc.edu/fsrg/
publications/wp2008-01-2nd%20version.pdf. "Local market" is generally defined
at the Crop Reporting Districts (CRD) level. Id. In general, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture definition of a CRD "is larger than a county but smaller than a
state." Id. at 9 n. 7.
276. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 272, at 64.
277. IIB PHILLIPE. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW '\I 535,
at 273-84 (3d ed. 2007).
278. Id. at 'II 53la, at 232-33 (Because courts often lack data regarding a firm's
elasticities, courts traditionally examine the firm's market share); see also id. at 'II
532a, at 242-43 ("[C]omputing market shares provides an indirect means for
estimating market power.").
279. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) ("The
FTC and the anti-trust division of the Justice Department adopted the HHI as the
preferred measure of market concentration in their 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.").
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Index (HHI).280 The HHI sums the squares of the scrutinized
firms' market shares and adds them to give a final index
number.28! In an industry with two firms, one with a 70
percent market share and one with a 30 percent share, the
HHI would be 5800 (70 2 + 302 ). 282 The DOJ and FTC consider a
HHI of below 1500 to be unconcentrated.283 A HHI between
1500 and 2500 is moderately concentrated,284 and a HHI above
2500 is highly concentrated.285 As applied to some of the
market shares described for Monsanto, the HHI for some crops
is highly concentrated.286
Monsanto's dominance can best be understood in historical
terms. For thousands of years, farmers have engaged in a
selection process to find or create seed that could produce the
highest quality product with the least effort and at the lowest
cost. Higher quality seed displaced lower quality alternatives
in the market. It is estimated that over 90 percent of field corn
seed varieties sold commercially in the United States in 1903
were extinct by 1983,287 the year when scientist Kary Mullis
discovered how to produce multiple copies of specific fragments

280. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 5.3
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter FTC Guidelines].
281. Id.
282. Andrew Chin, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Calculator, U. N.C. SCH. L.,
http://www.unclaw.com/chin/teaching/antitrust/herfindahl.htm., (last visited Sept.
16, 2013).
283. FTC Guidelines, supra note 280, § 5.3.
284. Id.
285. Id. The dominance condition that we are proposing need not be held by
just one firm or just one gene sequence. The combined market share of all GM
technologies acts to crowd out opportunities to purchase non-GM seeds and also
increases the probability of drift occurring in the local market. This can be
problematic both for organic farmers and for farmers who would prefer to not use
GM seeds for their yield and herbicide immunity characteristics but are forced to
use the seeds because no non-GM alternatives are available in the market for
purchase.
286. For example, if we assume that 91 percent of soybean crops in the United
States are produced with GM seed, see GMO STATISTICS, infra note 300, and that
Monsanto controls 90 percent of the GM seed market, see THE CENTER FOR FOOD
SAFETY, supra note 216, at 10, then Monsanto's market share for soybeans (both
GM and non-GM) is 82 percent. This would result in a HHI of 6724 (= 82 x 82),
indicating a high level of concentration. Naturally, the degree of concentration
relevant to each case will depend on the court's definition of an appropriate
geographic boundary as deemed pertinent to the case at hand.
287. RURAL ADVANCEMENT FOUND. lNT'L, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2011); CARY
FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE Loss OF
GENETIC DIVERSITY 65 (1990).
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of a strand of DNA.288 As the decades passed, more and more
farmers relied on fewer seed varieties289 while concurrently
increasing productivity and quality.290
In the 1980s, after Diamond v. Chakrabarty291 established
the legal right to patent a genetically modified organism,
property rights in agriculture shifted away from the ownership
of solely land and crops to ownership of specific gene sequences
within seeds and their progeny. 292 These sequences provided
resistance to certain pests, increased yield gains, and
encouraged
the
production
of
other
attractive
crop
characteristics. 293 Judging from market sales, one of the most
valued characteristics afforded by genetic manipulation is
resistance to herbicides, which are used to kill weeds without
killing the crop plant.294 Monsanto's Roundup Ready seed,
which allows for the liberal application of the Roundup
herbicide without harm to the crop, holds the largest market
share for GM crops, such as soybeans, alfalfa, corn, and
cotton. 295

288. Mark Lehrer, Suffolk Univ. & Preeta Banerjee, Brandeis Univ.,
Presentation to Eastern Academy of Management 47th Annual Meeting Program:
From Complex Processes to Real-Time General Purpose Technologies: Patterns of
Development in ERP Software and PCR DNA Analysis (May 15, 2010); Emily
Yoffe, Is Kary Mullis God? Nobel Prize Winner's New Life, ESQUIRE, July 1994, at
68-75.
289. In the wake of the corn blight that destroyed 15 percent of the United
States' corn crop in 1970, The National Academy of Sciences established the
Committee of Genetic Vulnerability of Major Crops to examine the vulnerability of
the United States' food and fiber supply. The final study, released in 1972, found
that most major crops in the United States were "impressively uniform genetically
and impressively vulnerable" to the same pathogens and pests as a result.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT, FY
1973-74, at 4, available at http://books.google.com/books?id=nlErAAAAYAAJ&
lpg= PA4&dq=Committee%20of"/o20Genetic%20Vulnerability%20of"/o20Major%20
Crops&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q=Committee%20of"/o20Genetic%20Vulnerability%20
of"/o20Major%20Crops&f=false.
290. See Schnier, supra note 54, at 388-91.
291. 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
292. See Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy,
Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 321 (2004).
293. Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps:
Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2167, 2176-77, 2181 (2004); Graham Brookes & Peter Barfoot,
Global Impact of Biotech Crops: Income and Production Effects, 12 AGBIOFORUM
184 (2009), http://agbioforum.org/v12n2/v12n2a04-brookes.htm.
294. THE CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 216, at 8-9.
295. Id. at 7-9; see Roundup Ready Seed Overview, MONSANTO, http://www.
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As a leading innovator in seed technology, Monsanto has
taken numerous steps to increase the dominance of its products
in the market. In 1996, Monsanto began a series of acquisitions
of major seed companies, including: Agracetus; Asgrow
Agronomics; Asgrow and Stine Seed; Calgene, Inc., Cargill's
international seed divisions; DeKalb Genetics; Delta and Pine
Land; Holden's Foundation Seed, Inc.; Monsoy; and Plant
Breeding International.296 As a result of these efforts,
Monsanto grew to become the second-largest seed company
behind Pioneer Hi-Bred (to whom it licenses its GM traits in a
separate arrangement), controlling most of the soybean market
and "almost half of the corn germplasm market in the U.S."297
Monsanto now provides seed technology "for at least 90 percent
of the world's genetically engineered crops."298
At the same time that Monsanto has been increasing its
market share to 90 percent of the world's genetically
engineered crops, the percentage of genetically engineered
crops likewise has been growing. "As recently as 1980, no
genetically modified crops were grown in the United States."299
However, by 2009, "eighty-five percent of the corn cultivated in
the United States, eighty-eight percent of the cotton, and
ninety-one percent of the soybeans were genetically
engineered."300 Monsanto's large market share of patented GM
seed in the agriculture industry certainly is dominant for
purposes of this proposed test.
In United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, the Supreme
Court expressed concern that "since the companies to the
agreement now control about one third of the railroad mileage
monsanto.com/weedmanagement/Pages/roundup-ready-system.aspx (last visited
Sept. 12, 2013) (describing which seeds are Roundup Ready).
296. THE CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 216, at 9-10.
297. Id. at 10.
298. Id.
299. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Monsanto's Harvest of Fear, VANITY
FAIR (May 2008), available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/
05/monsanto200805.
300. Nate Hausman, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh
of Equitable Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 168 n.108 (2011). There are of course
regional variations. As early as 2004, 97 percent of all cotton planted in
Mississippi used genetically modified seed and 95 percent of all soybeans and 79
percent of all corn grown in South Dakota did as well. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD &
BIOTECH, GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2004), at
6-9 [hereinafter GMO STATISTICS], available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Fact_Sheets/Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_
Genetically_Modified_Crops_Factsheet0804.pdf.
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of the United States," an agreement that certain companies
"obligate themselves to forever use the facilities of the terminal
company for all business destined to cross the river ... would
seem to guarantee against any competitive system."30! If
control of one-third of the market was once considered
problematic for the transport of freight, then control of market
shares substantially above that level in the production of seeds
should lead to a conclusion of dominance.302 Such dominance is
especially concerning when one considers that it encompasses a
product necessary to sustain life.
2.

Impracticability

The second element of the de facto SEP defense is that
growing the relevant crop has become impracticable (or
impossible) without the use of the patented GM technology.
This element reflects the traditional definition of a SEP as a
patent necessary to use the standard or a part thereof.303 In
particular, to satisfy this element, the farmer must show that
although GM crops were found on the farmland, it would not
have been reasonably possible for the farmer to keep those GM
crops off the land. The impracticability element can be thought
of as applying to three different scenarios.
In the first scenario, unpatented seed is unavailable in the
market and the farmer uses the patented GM seed. This is not
uncommon. Alternatives to GM seed often are not readily
available. According to a 2005 report by the Center for Food
Safety (CFS), the availability of non-GM seed has been
drastically reduced as a result _of Monsanto's actions to buy
competitors, license its technology to major seed sellers, and
buy out then shutter seed cleaners so that they can no longer
serve farmers wishing to save seeds for future plantings.304

301. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 400-01
(1912).
302. See discussion supra note 286.
303. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
304. THE CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 216, at 7. As to seed cleaners,
they provide a service to farmers that save seed from year-to-year, removing
extraneous leaves, rocks and so forth from the seed that they will eventually
plant. Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 839 (N.D. Ind. 2008). Monsanto
has engaged in a course of conduct aimed at closing seed cleaners, through
litigation. See id. (seed cleaner enjoined from cleaning seed, and by lobbying for
legislation at the state level that requires registration of seed cleaners). Jill
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Indiana soybean farmer Troy Roush tells CFS, "[y]ou can't even
purchase [heritage soybeans] in this market. They're not
available."305 Another farmer, who wished to remain
anonymous, concurred, saying, "Just about the only cottonseed
you can get these days is [genetically engineered]. Same thing
with the corn varieties. There's not too many seeds available
that are not genetically altered in some way."306 A survey of
farmers in seven agricultural counties in Illinois revealed that
roughly 40 percent of farmers reported that they did not have
any access to high-yield potential non-GM corn seeds in
2009.307 On a county-by-county basis the results varied: 32
percent of farmers lacked access to non-GM seed in Champaign
County, while 46.6 percent of farmers lacked access to non-GM
seed in Malta County.308 This scenario in which unpatented
seeds are unavailable in the market may arise when dealing
with direct-purchasing farmers. It may also arise when dealing
with indirect-purchasing farmers who grow crops, save seed,
and replant it. Because alternatives are unavailable, it is not
reasonably possible to exclude the GM crops from the
alternative crops. Lack of access to non-GM alternatives forces
non-organic farmers to purchase GM seeds (and thus, to license
the technology) even when the farmer may not desire to utilize
the GM properties.
In the second scenario, unpatented seed is available and
the farmer uses it, but the farmer's crops are mixed with
infringing, GM-seeded crops. This scenario would arise when
dealing with drift farmers; direct-purchasers, who end up with
residual seeds in their fields that cause unplanned GM crops in
future years; and indirect-purchasing farmers,
who
unknowingly grow the GM crop and then save the seed and
replant it. Like in the first scenario, the question is whether it
is reasonable to exclude the GM crops from alternative crops,
but the inquiry is more fact-intensive, as detailed below.

Sudduth, Where the Wild Wind Blows: Genetically Altered Seed and Neighboring
Farmers, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, 15 (citing Brian Williams, Battle Over
Farming Growing with Monsanto Seed Debate, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, April 4,
1999. at 2H).
305. THE CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 216, at 10.

306. Id.
307. Michael

E. Gray, Relevance of Traditional Integrated Pest Management
(IPM) Strategies for Commercial Corn Producers in a Transgenic Agroecosystem: A
Bygone Era?, 59 J. AGRIC. & FOOD CHEMISTRY 5852, 5855 (2011).
308. Id.
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Genetic drift is an extremely difficult process to monitor
and prevent. Researchers from the University of California at
Berkeley reported the presence of "introgressed transgenic
DNA constructs in native maize landraces grown in remote
mountains in Oaxaca, Mexico."309 That is, they found GM corn
in what should have been a field without it.310 What made this
discovery amazing is that the field was in the mountains, more
than twenty kilometers from the nearest major road, in a
country where it was illegal to plant GM corn.3 11 This study
implies that it may be impossible to prevent all GM DNA from
entering a non-GM field.312
When farmers desire to prevent genetic drift, the efforts
can be extremely expensive.3 13 One option that is often used is
the creation of buffer zones, where otherwise arable lands are
set aside from productive crop use.3 14 Such buffer zones can be
extremely helpful when adjacent lands hold GM seeds. One
study "tracked the drift of pollen from blue corn and [GM]
Roundup Ready corn into adjacent conventional corn. Corn
with marker traits (blue kernels or Roundup herbicide
tolerance) was planted adjacent to corn without those traits."315
Cross pollination was detected at six hundred feet.316 Based on
these results, a 150-foot buffer was suggested to be a
reasonable
distance
to
protect
against
GM
seed
contamination.3I 7 Despite the benefits of keeping errant pollen
out of the farmer's main crop, these buffer zones are not
309. Quist & Chapela, supra note 74, at 541-42.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an Advocacy Strategy for
GMO Accountability, 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 45 (2008).
313. Brief of Amici Curiae Farm & Ranch Freedom Alliance et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants in Support of Reversal at 2, Organic Seed Growers & Trade
Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2012-1298)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Farm & Ranch Freedom Alliance et al.].
314. 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c) (2012). (The National Organic Program actually
requires "distinct, defined boundaries and buffer zones such as runoff diversions
to prevent the unintended application of a prohibited substance to the crop or
contact with a prohibited substance applied to adjoining land that is not under
organic management.").
315. Peter Thomison, Managing ''Pollen Drift" to Minimize Contamination of
Non-GMO Corn, OHIO ST. U. EXTENSION FACT SHEET, available at http://ohioline.
osu.edu/agf-fact/pdf/0153.pdf (citing Patrick F. Byrne et al., Presentation at 2003
ASA-CSSA-SSSA Annual Meeting: Estimating Pollen-Mediated Flow in Corn
Under Colorado Conditions (Nov. 5, 2003)).
316. Id.
317. Id.
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without negative consequences to the farmer. The removal of
arable land from productive use reduces the total yield (and
thus the total revenue) of the farm.3 18 Moreover, even with
these precautions, drift may still occur: corn pollen can travel
one quarter mile, far exceeding conventional buffer zone
dimensions.3l 9
Irrespective of these efforts to prevent drift carried
through the winds, drift can take place in other ways as well.
Machinery used in harvesting and transportation can
contaminate crops, for example. This may be the farmer's own
machinery or, as in the case of Percy Schmeiser, contamination
may come from another farmer's "seed spilled from a passing
truck."320 In the case of the farmer's own machinery causing
the contamination, extra costs are imposed on the farmer who
must clean the machinery before passing from an area where
GM seed is used to one where it is not.3 21 Of course, cleaning
other farmers' trucks to prevent contamination is not a
workable solution.
Given that drift can take place through natural (e.g.,
winds) or manmade (e.g., trucks) means, farmers also are
required to take steps to prevent drift after the crop has started
to grow. One possible way to detect and reduce the likelihood of
infringing the patent is to conduct DNA testing on random
samples of purchased crops, but doing so is again burdensome
and costly.322 Given all these reasons, it is impractical for
farmers who do not desire GM crops on their lands to
guarantee exclusion.
In the third scenario, non-GM seed is available, but the
farmer does not use it. Instead, the farmer intentionally uses
the patented GM seed. This scenario is especially pertinent to
direct- purchasing farmers and indirect- purchasing farmers

318. 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c) (2012). See also Brief of Amici Curiae Farm & Ranch
Freedom Alliance et al., supra note 313, at 17.
319. Bob Nielson, Corn Segregation: A Necessary Evil in Today's Biotech Age,
PURDUE UNIVERSITY DEP'T AGRONOMY (Apr. 23, 2003) http://www.kingcorn.
org/news/articles.03/GMO_Segregation-0423.html.
320. Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, ~ 49 (Fed. Ct.).
321. David S. Bullock, Univ. of Ill., Marion. Desquilbet, Institut National de la
Recherche Agronomique & Elisavet I. Nitsi, Univ. of Ill., at the American
Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting: The Economics of Non-GMO
Segregation and Identity Preservation (July 30-Aug. 2, 2000).
322. Brief of Amici Curiae Farm & Ranch Freedom Alliance et al., supra note
313, at 10.
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who know they are usmg patented GM seed. The
impracticability inquiry in this scenario is more speculative
than the inquiry in the first two scenarios. Instead of asking
whether it is reasonably possible to exclude the GM crops, the
inquiry is an alternative-universe inquiry. That is, had the
farmer who intentionally used the patented GM seed actually
used public domain seed, would it have been unreasonable for
the farmer to attempt to exclude the GM crops? If so, the
impracticability element is satisfied even though alternatives
were available and the farmer did not necessarily attempt to
use them.323 This approach recognizes that it would be
inefficient to require a farmer to purchase non-GM seed and
take precautions to avoid drift knowing that those precautions
would be for naught, simply so they could fit into the second
scenario discussed above. Ultimately, because these farmers
are playing an important role by fulfilling a basic need like the
other farmers, this helps alleviate some of the concern that
they have "unclean hands" and causes us to err on the side of
including them within the scope of the defense rather than
excluding them.324
3. Basic Need

The third element for establishing a de facto SEP defense
is that the crop is primarily used in supplying a basic need. The
rule that property rights-including patent rights-are
inviolate pervades our law,325 yet that rule begins to show
cracks when it calls into question the supply of a basic need,
including food, shelter, or clothing.3 26 To be sure, a particular
farmer's GM crop could be used in the production of an
323. A similar inquiry is made in trade secret litigation when the defendant
misappropriated the plaintiffs information by improper means, but successfully
defends by arguing that the information was not protected because it would have
been readily ascertainable had the defendant opted for that route of discovering
the information. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act§ 1(4) (1985); see also Henry Hope X
Ray Prod., Inc. v. Harron Carrel, Inc. 674 F.3d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1982).
324. See supra Part 111.B. and note 270 (discussing inability of farmers with
"unclean hands" to use proposed affirmative defense).
325. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Rights to Exclude: Of
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y
593, 620-21 (2008).
326. Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45,
67 (2007) (citing Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the
Construction of Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2007)).
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unnecessary item. For example, cotton grown from GM seed
could be used to make a Halloween costume. Halloween
costumes are not a basic need, but under this test, judges
would look at whether the crop, as a class, is commonly used in
supplying a basic need. Because cotton is commonly used to
manufacture shirts, pants, and socks, the production of cotton
from GM seed would always satisfy the basic need element.
Likewise, the most common GM crops-wheat, corn, and
soybeans-would certainly fall within the basic need category,
as they make up a significant portion of all plant-derived food
consumed around the world.327
The basic need element is important not only because of
the importance of food, clothing, and shelter to survival, but
also because it limits the applicability of this defense. To
satisfy this portion of the test, the crop's primary use should be
to fulfill a basic need. Hemp can be used to make clothing (a
basic need), but its primary use is industrial (e.g., rope);3 28 it
follows that hemp would not meet the basic need test. These
limitations recognize that courts loathe compelling patent
licenses; the de facto SEP defense should be narrowly
construed so as to not upset this aversion.
C. Effects of De Facto SEP Status
1.

De Facto SEP Leads to an Implied License

This Article argues that where a patent becomes dominant,
it is impracticable to work around, and it covers a basic need,
courts should declare it a de facto SEP.329 Further, this Article
proposes that where a court finds that a patent has reached de
facto SEP status, the court should imply a license between
Monsanto and the farmer on RAND terms.330 Judge Posner's

327. Just nine of the world's plants-wheat, rice, corn, barley, sorghum/millet,
potato, sweet potato/yam, sugarcane, and soybean--constitute approximately
three-fourths of all plant-derived food consumed around the world. FOWLER &
MOONEY, supra note 287, at 17.
328. Susan David Dwyer, Note, The Hemp Controversy: Can Industrial Hemp
Save Kentucky? 86 KY. L.J. 1143, 1155 (1997).
329. See supra Part III.B. Compare an implied contract "inferred from conduct
other than the speaking or writing of words." JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 40 (5th ed. 2011).
330. See Part III.A. for a discussion of RAND. Clayson v. Zehe, 280 P.3d 731,
738 (Idaho 2012).
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decision in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. lends influential
support for this.33I In that case, Motorola claimed that one of
its patents (which allowed communication between cell phones
and cell towers) was standard-essential and that Apple was
infringing it.332 Motorola sought to enjoin Apple from using the
patent.333 In addressing whether injunctive relief for Motorola
would be appropriate, Judge Posner discussed that Motorola
and Apple were part of the same SSO, The European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSl).334 Judge
Posner continued, pointing out that injunctive relief was
improper given Motorola's legal obligation to provide its SEP to
Apple on RAND terms.335 The question is what gave rise to
that legal obligation? Importantly, Judge Posner seemed to
suggest that there was not yet an express license between
Motorola and Apple to provide Motorola's SEP on RAND terms,
but rather the parties were engaged in preliminary
negotiations to do so.336 It follows that Judge Posner could not
be holding that an express license required Motorola to provide
its SEP to Apple on RAND terms.33 7 The most logical
conclusion is that Judge Posner was holding an implied license
required Motorola to provide its SEP to Apple on RAND
terms.338

331. 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012). The word "influential" when referring
to a judge, or judicial opinion, has powerful connotations. However, we believe
that it is appropriate in this case. As one commentator points out:
Judge Posner's influence on the development of legal doctrine is
significant through his academic writings alone. Judge Posner's opinions
are also given greater deference because of his academic reputation....
Furthermore, Judge Posner's opinions are written in a straightforward
but fully theorized law-and-economics framework easily applicable to
other cases, thereby magnifying his influence.
Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 200 (1998).
332. Apple, 869 F. Supp at 912.
333. Id. at 913-14.
334. Id. at 912.
335. Id. at 913-14 ("I don't see how, given [RAND], I would be justified in
enjoining Apple from infringing the '898 unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that
meets the [RAND] requirement.").
336. Id. at 914 ("But Apple's refusal to negotiate for a license (if it did refuse
the parties offer competing accounts, unnecessary for me to resolve, of why
negotiations broke down) was not a defense to a claim by Motorola for a [RAND]
royalty."). This language indicates that, at best, Motorola was engaged in
preliminary negotiations rather than having formed a contract.
337. Id.
338. Id.; see Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL
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How did-if he did-Judge Posner hold that an implied
license required Motorola to provide its SEP to Apple on RAND
terms? The most eloquent exposition of such reasoning was set
out by Professor Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School:
[P]atent law may well limit the ability of a patentee to
ignore SSO IP rules requiring licensing on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. The most likely theory is a license
implied from the patentee's conduct, which I will call an
"implied license." Implied license is a doctrine of quasi
contract, and depends on the beliefs and expectations of the
parties.... [In the IP context, an implied license can arise
in many ways, including] where an IP owner invites a use
that would otherwise infringe, for example, by posting their
copyrighted work on the Internet for free download....
[This] is perhaps most analogous to standard setting. If an
IP owner agrees to license its patents that cover a standard
on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, others will
assume that they are free to use that standard so long as
they pay a reasonable royalty. There may be no express
license between the IP owner and any of the users of the
standard, but it seems perfectly reasonable to imply
one... _339

It should not escape notice that in apparently finding an
implied license in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Judge Posner
cited Professor Lemley on the same page that he refused to
enjoin Apple, stating "[b]y committing to license its patents on
[RAND] terms, Motorola committed to license [the patent] to
anyone willing to pay a [RAND] royalty and thus implicitly
acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a
license to use that patent."340

5416941, at *14 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012) (noting "it also could be that [Judge
Posner] believed ... that Motorola's commitments created an implied license that
rendered moot any claim to injunctive relief').
339. Lemley, supra note 247, at 1923-25 (footnotes omitted). Other scholars
have suggested the same approach should be applied in similar circumstances.
See Lichtman, supra note 162, at 1043 ("Courts could just as well interpret RAND
as creating an implied license, with the license rendering moot any claim to
injunctive relief or triple damages, but leaving the court with the power to
determine the royalty due.").
340. Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (citing, among others, Lemley, supra
note 247).
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Apple, Inc. u. Motorola, Inc. involved a de jure SEP.
However, the same principles apply to a de facto SEP. Where
patented technology reaches de facto SEP status and the
patentee does not voluntarily make such technology available
through an SSO on RAND terms, the equivalence between de
facto SEPs and de jure SEPs serves as a basis for finding an
implied license between the patentee and those who cannot
produce a product without infringing the patent.
In New York u. Microsoft Corp., the district court found
that
Microsoft's
application
programming
interfaces,
communication protocols, and related technology (collectively,
Microsoft's IP) had become essential for any software developer
that wanted its program to run on a computer using a
Microsoft operating system, that is, most computers.341
Phrased differently, because of Microsoft's dominance in the
industry, Microsoft's IP had become de facto standards.3 42 The
court implied a license between Microsoft and the software
developers on RAND terms.3 43 While New York u. Microsoft
Corp. was an antitrust action,3 44 not a case where Microsoft
was suing the software developers for patent infringement like
we see in Ralph,3 4 5 upon closer examination we see that the
underlying dynamics are the same. The software developers
could not produce their product without infringing Microsoft's
IP rights. Farmers cannot produce their product-e.g.,
soybeans-without infringing Monsanto's patent. In the first
case, the court implied a license to level the playing field;346 in
the second case, the court should imply a license to level the
341. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 n.11 (D.D.C. 2002),
af{'d, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
342. Id. at 89.
343. See id. at 177-78.
344. Id. at 86.
345. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F. 3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
346. Samuelson, supra note 267, at 1997-98; see also William H. Page &
Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from
the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement,
14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 83 (2007) ("Other provisions of the final
judgments that the court characterized as 'forward-looking' are even more
tenuously linked to proven monopolistic conduct. Of these, the 'most forward
looking' and most problematic in terms of the principles of antitrust relief is the
requirement that Microsoft 'make available' its proprietary communications
protocols that permit Windows servers to interoperate with Windows client
computers. These technologies had almost nothing to do with the government's
case, and there was no holding that Microsoft had manipulated them for
exclusionary purposes.").
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playing field.347
United States courts' recent willingness to find an implied
license brings this country's legal system in closer alignment
with that of Europe. In Europe, required licensing of de facto
SEPs is more established. For example, the European
Commission indicates that when a protected technology
becomes a de facto industry standard, "[t]he main concern will
then be to ensure that these standards are as open as possible
and applied in a clear non-discriminatory manner. To avoid
elimination of competition in the relevant market(s), access to
the standard must be possible for third parties on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms."348
Not only might refusing to license a de facto SEP on RAND
terms constitute an abuse of a dominant position, but
European authorities, like those in the United States, have
ordered licensing on RAND terms as a remedy for such
abuses.3 49 For example, in NDC Health u. IMS Health, IMS
Health held a copyright in a "brick structure" used for
collecting data about pharmaceutical sales, which was, in turn,
useful to pharmaceutical companies.350 IMS Health refused to
license its brick structure to two competitors and obtained
injunctions against them.351 One of the competitors, NDC,
made a complaint to the European Commission claiming that
IMS Health's refusal to license the brick structure was an
abuse of a dominant position.352 After considering the evidence,
347. See Samuelson, supra note 267, at 1983-84 ("Some commentators and
policymakers have called for a liability rule approach to patents on interfaces.
This would allow unlicensed persons to implement patented interfaces to achieve
interoperability as long as these persons offered reasonable compensation to the
patentee. A liability rule approach can be implemented in a number of ways.")
(footnotes omitted). See also id. at 1986 ("[Another] approach to interface patents
was proposed during the debate over the proposed European directive on the
patentability of computer-implemented innovations. The Foundation for Free
Information Infrastructure (FFII) urged the European Parliament to adopt its
proposal to require owners of patents on interfaces indispensable to achieving
interoperability to license such patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
(RAND) terms.") (footnotes omitted).
348. Commission Notice 2001 OJ (C 3) 2, 25 (discussing standards formed by a
group of firms).
349. Commission Decision 2001/165 EC, 2002 OJ (L 59) 18, 46-48 (EC),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:
059:0018:0049:EN:PDF.
350. See id. at 20-22.
351. Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S.
Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 444 (2002).
352. Case C·418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co.,
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the European Commission ordered IMS Health to grant access
to the copyrighted brick structure on RAND terms.353 As one
commentator noted,
After a careful economic analysis of the German market, the
Commission concluded that IMS' brick structure amounted
to a de facto standard essential for operating in that
relevant market. The conclusion was based on the fact that
consumers (i.e., pharmaceutical firms) were essentially
locked in to IMS' product and would not switch to any other
supplier."35 4

In summary, there is precedent in both the United States
and Europe in finding specific intellectual property to be de
facto standard essential in order to be able to compete in the
market.

2. A Return to Reasonable Royalties
Farmers who grow, replant, or sell GM seed find
themselves subject to suit by Monsanto and face traditional
patent infringement remedies based in tort.355 Tort remedies
are intended to "undo the harm"356 or "make the plaintiff
whole," but they also are intended to deter and punish.357 The
result is inflated damages. 358 As described earlier, one way
courts justify inflating damages in the GM seed context is by
finding that Monsanto may choose to "totally exclude others"
they may refuse to negotiate.359 This imbues Monsanto with
2004 E.C.R. 1-5069, 5074 (Apr. 29, 2004).
353. Commission Decision 2001/165 EC, 2002 OJ (L 59) 18, 46-48 (EC); see
also Robert Pitofsky et al., supra note 351.
354. Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad Between
Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European
Approaches Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455, 489 (2006)

(emphasis added).
355. See supra Parts LB., II.
356. See Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting the Consumer? Section 2-607(3)(A)
Notice of Breach in Nonprivity Contexts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 107, 150 (1987).
357. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 901 (1965).
358. See supra Part 11.B.
359. See Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The
hypothetical negotiation is often referred to as a 'willing licensor/willing licensee'
negotiation. However, this is an inaccurate, and even absurd, characterization
when, as here, the patentee does not wish to grant a license.") (quoting Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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disproportionate bargaining power, changing the hypothetical
negotiation from one involving an arms-length negotiation
between a willing buyer and willing seller, to a non-arms
length negotiation between a willing buyer and a recalcitrant
seller. The result is that any upward limit on damages is
removed, allowing the court to ignore the fact that "no sane
farmer would ever negotiate a royalty in excess of his
anticipated profits."360
Establishing the patent as a de facto SEP may ameliorate
the danger of inflated damages.361 By declaring that
Monsanto's genetic modifications are de facto SEPs, the court
can institute an implied license between Monsanto and the
farmer. As such, the remedies model changes from one based in
tort to one based in contract. Contract remedies are intended to
put the plaintiff in the position it would have been in had the
contract been performed, otherwise known as "benefit of the
bargain damages" or "expectation damages."362
Because there is no difference between an express license
(called a technology agreement in the case of GM seed) and an
implied license,363 the benefit of the bargain to Monsanto is the
360.
361.
362.

Id.
See id.
"[T]he license render[s] moot any claim to injunctive relief or triple
damages ... leaving the court with the power to determine the royalty due."
Lichtman, supra note 162, at 1043; see Lemley, supra note 247, at 1925 ("The IP
owner in that case has only a contractual claim for a royalty, not a not a cause of
action for patent infringement that might result in an injunction, treble damages,
and attorneys' fees.").
363. Courts have noted the equivalence of express and implied licenses in the
context of SEPs before. As one court explained,
To the extent that the Declared-Essential Patents are essential to any
ETSI standard and to the extent any of the alleged inventions described
in and allegedly covered by the Declared-Essential Patents are used,
manufactured, or sold by or for Apple, its suppliers, and/or its customers,
Apple is licensed to the Declared-Essential Patents pursuant to
Samsung's commitments to license its Declared-Essential Patents on
FRAND terms; or, in the alternative, Apple has the irrevocable right to
be licensed on FRAND terms under those patents. In addition, to the
extent that Apple is licensed, expressly, impliedly, or by operation of law,
by virtue of any agreement between Samsung and an Apple supplier,
Apple is licensed.
Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 944-45 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(quoting Counterclaim Defendant Apple Inc.'s Answer, Defenses, and
Counterclaims in Reply to Samsung's Counterclaims, Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL 3205801, at *25 (N.D. Cal.
July 21, 2011)); see also McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (explaining that express and implied contracts are subject to the same
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"Technology Fee" it charges to other farmers when they
purchase GM seed.364 All that is required is that the
Technology Fee be calculated for the number of acres in
question. Take the example of soybean seed: the price per bag
included a Technology Fee of $5.00.365 First, the court
multiplies the "acreage by the planting density to obtain the
total weight of soybean seeds planted."366 The court then
divides the total weight by fifty to calculate the number of bags
used (i.e., a fifty-pound bag equals one unit).36 7 The number of
bags is then multiplied by $5.00. Returning to the case of
Monsanto Co. v. Ralph discussed above, Ralph would pay a
royalty for each bag of GM seed he harvested and replanted:
(796+438) multiplied by $5/bag $6,170.368 Not $199,918.369
In the SEP context, courts are much more willing to base
their damage calculations on an established royalty.3 70 In
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., yet another Motorola case
involving an SEP, the court refused to exclude the testimony of
an expert witness who planned to testify that RAND terms
could be based on an initial 2.25 percent established royalty
rate.371 This initial royalty rate was based on prior license
agreements involving some or all of the standard-essential
patents.372 The case for using an established royalty in
Monsanto's GM seed litigation is even easier because the
established rate is for the exact same product.
The law should not ignore the fact that even if Monsanto
has not sought de jure SEP status, it has achieved de facto SEP

=

principles of contract law).
364. Recall that when following a remedy model based in tort, courts reject the
Technology Fee because simply awarding the Technology Fee would not result in
adequate deterrence. However, that objection disappears when the remedy model
is based in contract.
365. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
366. Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1018 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
367. See id.
368. See Ralph, 382 F.3d at 1379 (limiting calculations to soybeans, but
trebling for willful infringement).
369. See id.
370. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117-18 (W.D.
Wash. 2012).
371. Id.
372. Id. The court has not yet decided what the damages are for the breach of
contract. However, the fact that the court is entertaining the possibility of using
prior license agreements as a basis is more encouraging than the GM seed courts,
which regularly refuse prior license agreements as a measure of damages for
patent infringement. See supra Part II.A.
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status. Failing to recognize de facto SEP status for its patents
allows Monsanto to avoid the restrictions faced by holders of de
jure SEPs. It is well understood that SEP status means a
patent holder will receive less royalty per use.373 Firms accept
this trade-off, considering "additional sales volume they are
likely to achieve by having their technology incorporated into a
standard."374 Indeed, by avoiding SEP status for what is a de
facto SEP, Monsanto is able to have its cake and eat it too. It
has high sales that accompany an SEP without the trade-off of
a lower royalty.375
3. Inapplicability of Injunctions

Finally, following a contract model of remedies will negate
the possibility of an injunction. "The traditional goal of the law
of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to
perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the
loss resulting from breach."3 76 Indeed, courts and
373. Conferring SEP status on a patent actually can confer more market
power. As such, the owners of SEP are generally limited to charging a license fee
that is reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND). Thus, as Judge Posner stated
in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., "The proper method of computing a [RAND]
royalty starts with what the cost to the licensee would have been of obtaining, just
before the patented invention was declared essential to compliance with the
industry standard, a license for the function performed by the patent." Apple, Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
374. George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent
Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 920 (2011).
375. That holders ofSEP's received less in royalties in return for SEP status is
evidenced by an April 25, 2013 order in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., where
District Judge James Robart found that the appropriate RAND royalty for the
H.264 SEP portfolio is 0.555 cents per unit, and 3.471 cents per unit for the
802.11 SEP portfolio. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 207, Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013),
available at http://essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013.04.
25-D.E.-681-Findings-of-Fact-and-Conclusions-of-Law-setting-RAND-royalty.pdf;
see Matt Rizzolo, Microsoft-Motorola Update: Washington Court Sets RAND
Royalty for Motorola 802.11 and H.264 Patent Portfolios, ESSENTIAL PATENTBLOG
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/04/microsoft-motorola-update
washington-court-sets-rand- royalty-for-motorola -802-11-and-h-264-patent
portfolios/. This was much less than the $4.50 royalty that Motorola sought. See
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 145, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. Cl0-1823JLR (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013) ("[Motorola's expert's] calculation
resulted in payments from Microsoft to Motorola at a per unit royalty of $3.00 to
$4.50 or 1.15 % to 1. 73 % of the average selling price of the Microsoft Xbox.").
376. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (1981); see also
E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1147 (1970) ("Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors
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commentators are in general agreement that a court cannot
impose an injunction where a patent is an SEP.377 Judge
Posner stated in Apple, Inc. u. Motorola, Inc. that he would not
be justified in enjoining Apple from infringing [the patent at
issue] unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the
[RAND] requirement. By committing to license its patents
on [RAND] terms, Motorola committed to license the
[patent] to anyone willing to pay a [RAND] royalty and thus
implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate
compensation for a license to use that patent. 378
Instead of granting injunctive relief for future
infringement, courts should award ongoing royalties. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized the ability
to grant ongoing royalties in Paice LLC u. Toyota Motor
Corp. 379 As Professor Lemley argues, the ongoing royalty rate
should be the reasonable royalty.380 For GM seed infringement
cases, once the court uses the established royalty (as opposed to
inflated hypothetical negotiations) as the reasonable royalty,
the court should also use the established royalty as the ongoing
royalty rate for future infringement. This is a sensible result
because once an implied license is established, there is no
reason for terminating it merely because the patentee will be
compensated for prior use of its patent. Future use of the
patent is the same as the prior use; it makes little sense to
require the parties to enter into an express license agreement
when an implied one already exists..

to prevent breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach.")
(emphasis omitted).
377. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012)
(enjoining enforcement of a patent injunction entered in Germany).
378. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
379. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
380. Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 76 Mo.
L. REV. 695, 702 (2011) ("According to black-letter patent law, a reasonable
royalty represents the rate a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed
upon if they had known that the patent was valid and infringed. Conveniently,
that determination is precisely what an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction is
supposed to represent: what the parties would be willing to agree on now that
they know the patent is valid and infringed.") (footnote omitted).
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IV. OVERCOMING HOSTILITY TO COMPULSORY LICENSING
As discussed above, although court-compelled licensing is
rare, especially where the technology is protected by exclusive
rights, it is not entirely new. Where technology is granted SEP
status by an SSO (a de jure SEP) the court can imply a license,
as Judge Posner appears to have done in Apple Inc. u.
Motorola, Inc.381 Likewise, where firm dominance gives rise to
an SEP (a de facto SEP), a court may imply a license, as the
judge did in New York u. Microsoft Corp.382
Further, federal legislation evidences a willingness on the
part of lawmakers to compel licenses when necessary to level
the playing field between corporations and farmers. The Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA)383 was enacted in 1970 to deal
with certain classes of plants.38 4 It created sui generis rights
analogous to patent rights in certain sexually reproduced
plants.385 The PVPA gives patent-like protection in the form of
a certificate to new sexually-reproducing plant varieties that
are distinct, uniform, and stable. 386 A PVPA certificate holder
is given the right to sue for infringement, which consists of,
inter alia, selling or marketing the variety, sexually
multiplying the variety as a step in marketing, using the
variety in producing a hybrid, or dispensing the variety
without notice that the variety is protected.387
Unlike utility patents, PVPA rights are subject to
substantial limitations. The most important for our purposes is
the statutory "saved seed" exemption. This exemption "allows
farmers who grow protected varieties (obtained through
authorized sources) to save the resulting seed for the
production of a subsequent crop 'for use on the farm."'388
Importantly for our purposes, the PVPA creates a scheme in
381. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
382. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 177-78 (D.D.C. 2002),
aff'd, in relevant part, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
383. 7 u.s.c. §§ 2321-2583 (2012).
384. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138
(2001).
385. Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protections: Sound and
Fury . .. ?, 39 Hous. L. REV. 727, 731 (2002).
386. 7 u.s.c. § 2402 (2012).
387. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 139 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2000)).
388. Janis & Kesan, supra note 385, at 751-52 (footnote omitted); see also 7
U.S.C. § 2543 (2013) (permitting farmers to engage in "bona fide" sales of saved
seed "for other than reproductive purposes.").
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which the Agriculture Secretary will grant two-year
compulsory licenses at a reasonable royalty rate when "the
Secretary determines that such declaration is necessary in
order to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in this
country and that the owner is unwilling or unable to supply the
public needs for the variety at a price which may reasonably be
deemed fair."389
Likewise, more recently introduced legislation, the Seed
Availability and Competition Act of 2013, would allow those
who plant patented seed or seed derived from patented seed to
retain and replant seed if the farmer notifies the Secretary of
Agriculture and pays a fee to be established by the
Secretary.390 Under this proposed legislation, these fees would
then be distributed to patentees.39 1 Because compulsory
licensing has previously been contemplated and implemented,
the idea of compelling a license of GM seed through the de facto
SEP framework provided in this Article may be more digestible
to courts and Congress.
Importantly, this proposal does not require Congressional
action or new bureaucracy. Under the proposed framework,
consistent with existing common law doctrine, a court can
imply a license from Monsanto to a farmer where: (1) the
patent holder has achieved dominance in a given field, (2) it is
impracticable to expect that a farmer could operate without
infringing the patent, and (3) the farmer is growing a crop used
to meet a basic human need.392 That does not preclude courts
and Congress from acting concurrently; courts could use the
proposed framework while they wait for Congress to pass the
Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013.393 In fact, the
proposal in this Article is likely to present the most viable
solution, as passage of the Seed Availability and Competition

389.
390.

7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012); see also Janis & Kesan, supra note 385, at 752.
Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013, H.R. 193, !13th Cong. § 2

(2013).

391. Id. Although the bill sounds promising, Representative Kaptur has
introduced similar bills every year since 2004 that have never received any
activity by the committees to which they were referred. Tony Dutra, Kaptur
Reintroduces Seed Replanting Bill But Supreme Court Decision Coming Soon,
BNA PATENT, http://www.bna.com/kaptur-reintroduces-seed-nl 7179871884/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013).
392. See supra Parts III.B., III.C.
393. Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013, H.R. 193, !13th Cong. § 2
(2013).
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Act of 2013 is unlikely.394
CONCLUSION

Whether Monsanto's lawsuits against farmers are
reasonable is debatable. But when courts inflate damage
calculations and routinely grant injunctions in these cases,
they remove the dispute from the realm of reasonableness and
threaten the traditions of an age-old profession and those who
have practiced them. Moreover, the overwhelming dominance
of GM products in the production of food and clothing (human
needs) sets them apart from other technological innovations.
As such, courts or Congress should be willing to deviate
from their reluctance to use compulsory licensing and embrace
a more balanced system. Such a system would allow farmers to
continue their traditions and professions, but would also
permit and encourage companies like Monsanto to continue to
develop technologies to enhance agricultural production.
Recognizing a de facto SEP affirmative defense, in which the
farmer proves (1) dominance in the field; (2) impracticability of
operating without infringing; and (3) the crop is used to meet a
basic human need, would result in an implied license to the
farmer under RAND terms. This approach forces courts to
reconceptualize the dispute as a traditional contract dispute
rather than one based in tort, where inflated damages are the
norm. As a result, a more appropriate balance between age-old
traditions and innovation continues.
394. The Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2013 is unlikely to pass, as
it has been stuck in the House Agriculture Committee since January 4, 2013.
Committee members appear to have wielded their "'blocking power'-if committee
members disfavor the bill for any reason, they can do nothing and allow the bill to
languish in committee." Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escape
Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate Treatment in the Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV.
149, 1 71 (2008) (footnote omitted). In fact, this Act is proposed-and fails-almost
annually. See, e.g., Representative Kaptur Introduces Seed Availability and
Competition Act, U.S. FED. NEWS, Aug. 4, 2009 ("Rep. Marcy Kaptur, D-Ohio, has
introduced the Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2009 (R.R. 3299),
legislation that would 'require persons who seek to retain seed harvested from the
planting of patented seeds to register with the Secretary of Agriculture and pay
fees set by the Secretary for retaining such seed."'); Law Would Allow the Saving
of Biotech Seed, THE FARMER'S GUARDIAN, July 16, 2004, at 84 ("Now legislation
moving through the US Congress would allow American farmers to save and
replant patented seed. The Seed Availability and Competition Act of 2004 would
decriminalize the act of saving patented seed as long as a producer reports the
quantity and type of seed retained and pays a technology fee to the USDA.").
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